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Much has been written about the rule that prevents the use of evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure; as one leading commentator wrote, without fear of
exaggeration, "[t]here is a vast literature on this subject."' Yet, the quantity of the
literature threatens to obscure important areas of emerging agreement.
The discussion that follows presents seven theses. The first four enjoy
widespread support, with considerable justification: 1) the exclusionary rule is not
constitutionally required; 2) history does not resolve the propriety of the
exclusionary rule; 3) the Fourth Amendment requires an effective deterrent to
unreasonable search and seizure; and 4) the exclusionary rule offers some
meaningful deterrence of unreasonable search and seizure because of the political
costs of exclusion. Although the remaining theses are somewhat more
controversial, the general acceptance of the first four and, in particular, the
recognition that exclusion imposes political rather than economic costs, I will
contend, powerfully suggests the soundness of the final three: 5) exclusion of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not invariably required
to preserve its deterrent efficacy; 6) exclusion is sometimes required to achieve
constitutionally sufficient deterrence even in the absence of culpable misconduct;
and 7) alternatives to exclusion are of uncertain efficacy because they rest on
problematic theories of deterrence. Collectively, the seven theses amount to a
grudging defense of the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule has many
defects, but there are great difficulties identifying a superior alternative.
I. THESIS ONE: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED
As a matter of contemporary doctrine, Thesis One is uncontroversial. It is
thought to follow from the Fourth Amendment's text:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. The author is indebted to
Christopher Slobogin for organizing this symposium and inviting the author's participation, and for
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I Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 119, 119 n.l (2003).
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probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
-2seized.
As the Supreme Court has observed, "[t]he Amendment says nothing about
suppressing evidence obtained in violation of this command."3 Indeed, "[t]he
wrong condemned by the Amendment is 'fully accomplished' by the unlawful
search or seizure itself, and the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to
'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered."'
Rather, "[t]he rule's sole purpose . . . is to deter future Fourth Amendment
violations."5 The Court accordingly characterizes the exclusionary rule as "a
'prudential' doctrine, created by this Court to 'compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty.' 6
It is difficult to argue with this view. Compare the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition on compelled self-incrimination: "No person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."7 This is a prohibition on the
use of particular evidence-the testimony of witnesses compelled to incriminate
themselves. Thus, as Justice Thomas has written, "the Self-Incrimination Clause
contains its own exclusionary rule." Similarly, the Sixth Amendment also
addresses the receipt of evidence by requiring that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him,"9 a command that the Court has also characterized as an "exclusionary
rule."o The Fourth Amendment, in contrast, does not address the receipt of
evidence. It concerns conduct undertaken outside of the courtroom-search and
seizure-and the requisites for a valid warrant.11
2 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011). Accord, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514
U.S. 1, 10 (1995).
4 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (citations omitted) (quoting Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)). Accord, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v.
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 362 (1998); Evans, 514 U.S. at 10.
s Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426. Accord, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-40
(2009); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987); Stone, 428 U.S. at 486; United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
6 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426 (citations omitted) (quoting Scott, 524 U.S. at 363, and Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 640 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 498 (1971) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The Self-
Incrimination Clause in and of itself directly and explicitly commands its own exclusionary rule.").
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006).
" For helpful arguments along similar lines, see Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE
L.J. 906, 918-22 (1986); Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution:
Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87
MICH. L. REv. 907, 909-11 (1989).
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At one time, however, the Court seemed to regard the exclusionary rule as
constitutionally compelled. For example, when it first adopted the exclusionary
rule for federal prosecutions in Weeks v. United States,'2 the Court reasoned that
exclusion was required to give the prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure
substance: "If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment . . . is of no value, and . . . might as well be stricken from the
Constitution."' 3 The Court later wrote that if the government can utilize the fruits
of an unreasonable search or seizure, it "reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form
of words."' 4 This line of argument, however, fails to justify the exclusionary rule.
While the Fourth Amendment may demand some remedy for unreasonable search
and seizure to make that prohibition meaningful, it does not follow that the
requisite remedy is exclusion.
A few scholars have argued that exclusion is constitutionally required to
restore the government and the individual to the positions they occupied prior to a
Fourth Amendment violation. 5 Yet, the advocates of this view do not claim that
the Fourth Amendment demands that the status quo ante always be restored; they
agree, for example, contraband obtained through unreasonable search and seizure
need not be returned.16 Presumably they would agree as well that the Fourth
Amendment does not require the return of stolen property to a thief-or the body
of a victim to a murderer-if recovered through unreasonable search or seizure.
As one advocate of this rationale for exclusion acknowledged, "[t]he proper
approach is one that vindicates the exclusionary principle but takes other factors
into account as well."17 The concession is warranted-the law of remedies, for
example, has never invariably required injunctive relief to halt every violation of
law, but instead requires a balancing of the equities and consideration of the
public's interests.' 8 If an assessment of the propriety of a remedy should take into
account the problems that inhere in returning contraband to an offender, however,
then it is entirely unclear why it cannot also consider the problems that inhere in
preventing the prosecution from utilizing probative evidence of guilt. The
exclusionary rule's tendency to free the guilty, after all, is at the heart of the case
12 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
" Id. at 393.
14 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
15 See, e.g., William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEo. L.J. 799, 840-44 (2000); Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule
Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOlUST L. REv. 261, 285-94 (1998);
William A. Schroeder, Restoring the Status Quo Ante: The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as
a Compensatory Device, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 633, 652-60 (1983).
16 See, e.g., Heffernan, supra note 15, at 844-45; Norton, supra note 15, at 292-93;
Schroeder, supra note 15, at 673 n.285.
1 Heffernan, supra note 15, at 845.
18 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982).
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against it.' 9 There is, of course, a famous objection to a rule that provides "[t]he
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." 20 Given the interest in
utilizing probative evidence of guilt, one could conclude that even if the
acquisition of evidence involved an unreasonable search and seizure, its retention
for use at a criminal trial is nevertheless reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
To be sure, it is well settled that even a seizure lawful at its inception can
become unreasonable because of its duration.2' It is equally settled that an
unreasonable search cannot be justified by what is found.22 These rules, however,
address the manner in which the authorities obtain evidence of wrongdoing, not its
retention for use in a criminal prosecution. Even if the manner in which the
authorities obtain evidence is constitutionally unreasonable, it does not follow its
retention for evidentiary use in a criminal prosecution must also be regarded as
unreasonable.2 3
To this, one can respond that the government's retention of property that has
been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is itself an unreasonable seizure
because it represents unlawful interference with the owner's rights in the seized
24whproperty. Indeed, when it first articulated the exclusionary rule in Weeks, the
Court invoked the right of the owner of property wrongfully seized to demand its
return in the course of embracing exclusion.25 As the Court later observed, "[t]he
remedial structure . . . of Weeks v. United States was arguably explainable in
property terms." 26  Yet, this justification for exclusion as vindicating property
19 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 25-26 (1997); Harry M. Caldwell & Carol M. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule:
Heeding Justice Blackmun's Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding
About its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 50-52 (1994); Richard A. Posner,
Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REv. 49, 51-53 (1981); Patrick Tinsley, N.
Stephan Kinsella & Walter Block, In Defense of Evidence and Against the Exclusionary Rule: A
Libertarian Approach, 32 S.U. L. REv. 63, 68-71 (2004); John Barker Waite, Judges and the Crime
Burden, 54 MICH. L. REv. 169 (1955); Malcolm Richard Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why
Suppress Valued Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214, 220-22 (1978).
20 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
21 See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
22 See, e.g., Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 543 (1990) (per curiam); Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29-30 (1927).
23 This observation also answers a related argument for exclusion contending that the Due
Process Clause forbids the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution. See, e.g., Lane
V. Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 141, 148-50 (1978). If the government's retention of unlawfully obtained evidence
for use in a prosecution is not regarded as consistent with the Fourth Amendment, then it is difficult
to understand why its retention for use at trial becomes somehow inconsistent with due process.
24 See, e.g., William C. Heffernan, On Justifying Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 1989 Wis. L.
REv. 1193, 1216-19; Heffernan, supra note 15, at 832-36.
25 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
26 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (citation omitted). For additional discussion
of this understanding, see Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy,
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 555, 587-92 (1996); Heffernan,
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rights is ultimately incoherent since the law of property does not demand exclusion
to vindicate property rights.
In the seminal case of Boyd v. United States,27 even as it relied on the property
rights of the owner to hold that the compulsory production of business records
amounted to a constitutionally unreasonable search and seizure,28 the Court
acknowledged that a "search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods
liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof' would be
unobjectionable because "[iun the one case, the government is entitled to the
possession of the property; in the other it is not."29 The Court added that when
search and seizure is undertaken in order to inspect property subject to tax or tax
records that must be made available for inspection, to locate contraband or identify
property subject to seizure to satisfy a judgment, or to recover stolen goods, the
government or the creditor are intruding on no property rights. 30 Thus, as Boyd
acknowledged, a property-based justification for exclusion cannot support
exclusion of items in which the defendant has no recognized property interest, such
as contraband, stolen or forfeitable goods, or required records. Similarly, the
property-based rationale cannot justify exclusion where there has been no
infringement on recognized property interests, such as nontrespassory wiretapping,
which the Court held was outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment during
the era in which constitutional protection was tied to property rights. 3  Beyond
this, an argument for exclusion that rests on property law entitlements is unavailing
if applicable property law does not demand the return of unlawfully seized
property. If, putting the Fourth Amendment aside, applicable property law gives
the authorities the right to retain even unlawfully seized property for use as
evidence, then the owner's property law rights provide no basis for the owner to
demand the property's return, much less exclusion.
supra note 24, at 1220-29; and Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of
Remedies, How It Changed, and How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 132, 166-74 (2012).27 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
28 Id. at 622-32.
29 Id. at 623.
30 Id. at 624.
3' See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).32 A related argument for exclusion rests on the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on compelled
self-incrimination. In Boyd, the Court wrote: "[W]e have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a
man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from
compelling him to be a witness against himself." 116 U.S. at 633. Although this observation was
limited to the use of written statements of a defendant, the Court subsequently required suppression
of even contraband on the theory that requiring the defendant to assert a property interest in
contraband would amount to compelled self-incrimination. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,
33-34 (1925). This rationale was undermined, however, when the Court later held that a defendant's
statements supporting a motion to suppress evidence cannot be used to establish guilt. See Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94 (1968). Moreover, when the authorities obtain evidence
through search and seizure, the defendant is not being compelled to assist the prosecution as a
"witness" or otherwise, as the Court later held. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472-75
(1976). For additional trenchant criticism of the Fifth Amendment rationale, see AMAR, supra note
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Another argument for exclusion rests on the view that the use of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence is an impermissible judicial legitimation of
unconstitutional conduct. In Weeks, the Court reasoned:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures . . .
should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are
charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to
which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights.33
Justice Holmes later added: "If the existing code does not permit district attorneys
to have a hand in such dirty business it does not permit the judge to allow such
iniquities to succeed." 34
Doctrinally, this rationale has not fared well. When the Court applied the
exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio,35 the Court wrote that "the purpose
of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it."' 36 Only in passing did the Court mention 'the imperative of judicial
integrity.' 3 7  Since then, the Court has denied that concerns about judicial
integrity are separate from the deterrence justification for exclusion.
Nevertheless, some still argue that the admission of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence amounts to impermissible legitimation of unconstitutional conduct, 39 or
an abrogation of the judicial duty to enforce the Constitution.40 Indeed, there is
19, at 22-25; TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S EXCLUSIONARY
RULE 9-10, 92-93 (2013); and Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary
Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 425-27 (1999).
3 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
34 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting). For a more elaborate exploration of
this view, see 3 ANTONY DUFF ET AL., THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE
CRIMINAL TRIAL 236-41 (2007).
s 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
36 Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
3 Id. at 659 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 n.22 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 485-86 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976).
3 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 152-53 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Heffernan, supra note 15, at 832-42; Timothy Lynch, In Defense ofthe Exclusionary Rule, 23 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 711, 737-41 (2000); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is
Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 48-51 (1998); Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin,
"A More Majestic Conception": The Importance ofJudicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary
Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 75-76 (2010).
See, e.g., Ruth W. Grant, The Exclusionary Rule and the Meaning ofSeparation ofPowers,
14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 173, 196-200 (1991); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The
Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16
CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 590-97 (1983); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up from Calandra:
The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251, 295-302 (1974);
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surely something attractive about the view that a judiciary sworn to uphold the
Constitution cannot ignore constitutional violations that produce an advantage to a
party in litigation.4 1 Yet, it puts the cart before the horse to claim that exclusion is
required to enforce the Constitution; as we have seen, the Fourth Amendment's
text is silent on the evidentiary use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
Moreover, like the status quo ante argument considered above, it is difficult to
explain why the judicial integrity rationale for exclusion does not yield to
countervailing considerations.
Consider Walder v. United States,42 in which the Court held that
unconstitutionally obtained evidence could be used to impeach a defendant's
testimony to prevent "a perversion of the Fourth Amendment" because it saw no
"justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony
in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility."43 The
point is powerful. It is a strange notion of judicial integrity that enables a criminal
defendant to obtain a wrongful acquittal through perjured testimony that the
prosecution is not permitted to rebut. Similarly, as we have seen, few argue that
the judiciary must always restore the status quo ante by, for example, ordering the
return of contraband if unlawfully seized. Yet, once it is agreed that the judiciary
need not set all unlawful search and seizure at naught when the consequences of
such a remedy are deemed unacceptable, it becomes unclear why the judiciary
must facilitate the acquittal of the guilty through exclusion." One might also
argue that a rule that requires jurors to decide cases without the benefit of
probative evidence is a serious distortion of the judicial function.45 And, if victims
of unreasonable search and seizure are offered an effective alternative remedy,
then it becomes quite difficult to characterize the judiciary as effectively complicit
Rohith V. Srinivas, The Exclusionary Rule as Fourth Amendment Judicial Review, 49 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 179, 210-24 (2012).
41 Cf Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examination of the
Exclusionary Rule, 9 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 149, 154-65 (2012) (reporting experimental findings
indicating that subjects more often supported exclusion on an integrity rather than a deterrence
rationale).
42 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
43 Id at 65 (footnote omitted).
4 The problems that inhere in permitting the guilty to escape punishment similarly answer
Justice Brandeis' famous argument for exclusion:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If
the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting). The rhetoric is stirring, but this
position rests on an unsupported empirical claim about the effects of government misconduct. More
important, a regime that requires acquittals of the guilty might also produce "contempt for law." For
a more elaborate critique of Justice Brandeis' position, see Eugene Milhizer, The Exclusionary Rule
Lottery Revisited, 59 CATH. U. L. REv. 747, 763-72 (2010).
45 See Todd C. Pettys, Instrumentalizing Jurors: An Argument Against the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 837, 843-54 (2010).
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in a constitutional violation, or abdicating its obligation to assess the
constitutionality of official action, merely because it rejects exclusion.46
As we have seen, contemporary doctrine rejects any claim that the Fourth
Amendment requires use of the exclusionary rule. At least doctrinally, Thesis One
has become conventional wisdom.
II. THESIS Two: HISTORY DOES NOT RESOLVE THE
PROPRIETY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Justice Holmes once wrote, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." 47
Indeed, when interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the Court has written, "we are
guided by 'the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
afforded by the common law at the time of the framing... ."'4 Thus, historical
evidence could shed considerable light on the soundness of the exclusionary rule.
Yet, only rarely is history invoked in the exclusionary rule debate. Opponents
of exclusion sometimes mention that the remedy was not utilized in the framing-
era, but without placing significant weight on this claim. 49 A notable exception is
Akhil Amar, who premises much of his opposition to exclusion on the fact that in
the framing era, the remedy for a wrongful search and seizure was an award of
damages in tort.50 Roger Roots has taken a different view of framing-era practice,
assembling a handful of precedents that suggest that something resembling an
exclusionary remedy was recognized.5 1 The existence of a few precedents for
exclusion, however, hardly establishes that it was a routine practice. 52  As
46 For additional critiques of the judicial-integrity rationale for exclusion, see Donald R.
Dripps, The "New" Exclusionary Rule Debate: From "Still Preoccupied with 1985" to "Virtual
Deterrence", 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 743, 783-90 (2010); Milhizer, supra note 44, at 772-81; and
Slobogin, supra note 32, at 433-37.
47 N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
48 Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (internal quotations omitted). To similar
effect, see, for example, Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008); Florida v. White, 526 U.S.
559, 563 (1999); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S.
927, 931 (1995).
49 See, e.g., Tinsley, Kinsella & Block, supra note 19, at 64-65; John H. Wigmore, Using
Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479, 479-80 (1922); Matt J.
O'Loughlin, Comment, Exigent Circumstances: Circumscribing the Exclusionary Rule in Response
to 9/11, 70 UMKC L. Rev. 707, 708-09 (2002).
5o See AMAR, supra note 19, at 20-22. For a similar argument centered on framing-era
understandings, see William Gangi, The Exclusionary Rule: A Case Study in Judicial Usurpation, 34
DRAKE L. REV. 33, 39-46, 125-29 (1984-85).
s1 See Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45
GoNZ. L. REv. 1, 14-20 (2009-10).
52 Most of the framing-era precedents involve release from custody as a remedy for wrongful
arrest. See id at 20-30. This, of course, is a very different remedy than the exclusion of wrongfully-
obtained evidence. Indeed, the exclusionary rule has never been understood to authorize this remedy.
See, e.g., United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); Exparte Johnson, 167 U.S. 120, 125-27
(1897). Roots also relies on the framing-era rule prohibiting the seizure of "mere evidence," while
acknowledging that it was based on framing-era conceptions of property rights as well as the
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Professor Amar observed, no less an authority than Justice Story once wrote that
"evidence is admissible on charges for the highest crimes, even though it may have
been obtained by a trespass upon the person, or by any other forcible and illegal
means."53 One should exercise some skepticism when twenty-first century lawyers
claim insight into the law of another era not shared by the greatest legal minds of
the day. If we confine ourselves to framing-era practice, Professor Amar likely has
the better of the argument. By far the greater problem with the historical case
against exclusion, however, is its inattention to historical context.
In England, until roughly the time of the American Revolution, the only thing
resembling a police officer was a constable, an official charged with executing
warrants and who also had authority to appoint beadles responsible for clearing the
streets of beggars and vagrants by day and keeping the community safe at night.54
This system emerged in the colonies and remained in place in the framing era, with
the investigative process largely confined to the execution of warrants. The
remaining law enforcement duties of constables, sheriffs, and their employees
consisted of responding to breaches of the peace, offenses committed in their
presence, and pursuing offenders when summoned in the wake of a crime.55 As
one study of law enforcement in Boston explained:
The formal agencies of control, the justices of the peace, sheriffs,
constables, and watchmen, were all derived from the English, pre-
urban past. Their effectiveness, in Massachusetts, depended upon
the same conditions which made the town meeting workable.
Through the eighteenth century the use of legal force was
ordinarily a direct response to the demands of private citizens for
help. The victim of robbery or assault called a watchman, if
available, and afterward applied to a justice for a warrant and a
constable to make or aid in the arrest. The business of detection
was largely a private matter, with initiative encouraged through a
system of rewards and fines paid to informers. Neither state nor
prohibition on compelled self-incrimination. See Roots, supra note 51, at 37-45. As we have seen,
however, both the property-based and self-incrimination arguments in support of the exclusionary
rule are deeply problematic.
s3 AMAR, supra note 19, at 21 (quoting United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832,
844 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
54 See ELAINE A. REYNOLDS, BEFORE THE BOBBIES: THE NIGHT WATCH AND POLICE REFORM IN
METROPOLITAN LONDON, 1720-1830, 7-44 (1998).
s5 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 28-29,
68 (1993); Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case
Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 239, 419-32 (2002); George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the
Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1451, 1468-72 (2005).
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town made any provision for the identification or pursuit of the
unknown offender, except through the coroner's inquest.56
Thus, as George Thomas put it, what framing-era officers "did not do was
investigate crime."57  Even their authority to make arrests absent judicial
authorization was sharply limited. For misdemeanor offenses, a warrantless arrest
was considered justifiable only if the offense occurred in the presence of the
person making the arrest and the arrestee was in fact guilty, meaning that the
acquittal of the arrestee exposed the individual making the arrest to liability for
58 feois
trespass. For felonies, a warrantless arrest was justified only if a felony had in
fact been committed and there was "probable cause of suspicion" to believe that
the arrestee had committed the offense. 59 Beyond their limited authority, framing-
era law enforcement officials had to be wary of undertaking search and seizure
because of the threat of tort liability. Framing-era officers acting without a warrant
faced personal liability in tort if they undertook search and seizure under
circumstances that a jury might later deem inadequate.o Officers executing a valid
warrant, in contrast, were immune from liability,6' although there is evidence that
officers faced liability for seeking a warrant that did not produce contraband or
evidence of a crime.62
An approach to law enforcement that so enfeebled the law-enforcement
63function, however, proved deeply problematic as the nation grew. As Carol
Steiker observed in a response to Professor Amar's reliance on framing-era
56 ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON 1822-1885, 6-7 (1967). For a similar
description of framing-era policing in New York City, see JAMES F. RICHARDSON, THE NEW YORK
POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1901, 3-22 (1970).
5 George C. Thomas III, Stumbling Toward History: The Framers' Search and Seizure
World, 43 TEX. TECH L. REv. 199, 201 (2010) (footnote omitted).
58 See Davies, supra note 55, at 323-24.
5 See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547,
621-22, 624-25, 631-33 (1999).
60 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 19, at 11-17, 20-21; WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602-1791, 593-96, 760-61 (2009); Davies, supra
note 59, at 621-22, 624-25, 665-66; Thomas, supra note 57, at 225-28. If a search produced
incriminating evidence, the evidence provided a defense to tort liability, see AMAR, supra note 19, at
6-7, although there is some debate about whether this defense was the case for a trespass to a house.
Compare Davies, supra note 59, at 647-49 (denying the existence of immunity), with Fabio Arcila,
Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1275, 1316-24 (2010) (marshaling evidence to
support immunity).
61 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 19, at 12-13, 15-16; Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Framers' Search
Power: The Misunderstood Statutory History ofSuspicion and Probable Cause, 50 B.C. L. REv. 363,
373-74 (2009); Roots, supra note 51, at 8 n.39.
62 See Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-Law
Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in "Due Process of Law"- "Fourth Amendment Reasonableness"
is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. REv. 51, 91-93 (2010).
63 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 27-28, 68; Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the
Challenges of Contextual Change and Legal Dynamism in Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81
Miss. L.J. 1085, 1097-1101 (2012).
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practice: "[T]he colonial institutions of the constabulary and the watch were
extremely ineffectual in combatting any serious threats to public security."" Thus,
in the nineteenth century, large cities began establishing police forces in response
to growing urban lawlessness and instability. 65 The emergence of modem police
departments with investigative responsibilities was a gradual process; through the
nineteenth century, the ratio of police to population remained low, and officers
often discharged their duties in a perfunctory, corrupt, or brutal fashion.66 It was
not until the Progressive Era around the turn of the century that a wave of reform
produced something resembling professional police departments. 67
As framing-era limitations on the authority of officers proved inadequate to
address the needs of the nation and modem police forces with investigative
responsibilities emerged, legal arrangements changed to accommodate the
perceived need for law-enforcement officials with more robust investigative and
crime-prevention responsibilities. For example, in 1925, in Carroll v. United
States, the Supreme Court first held that the Fourth Amendment permitted a
warrantless search and seizure for evidence on probable cause even absent
authority to make an arrest, a development with little framing-era support aside
from customs searches of ships. 69 In 1968, in Terry v. Ohio, 70 the Court first held
that the police had authority to engage in investigative detention and a protective
frisk for weapons even absent probable cause to arrest, a development with equally
dubious framing-era support.7 1 The threat of tort liability facing officers engaged
in investigative and crime-prevention functions also contracted. For one thing,
indemnification became common. Even in the early years of the Republic,
Congress began to indemnify public officials for judgments against them arising
from the performance of their duties;72 today, public employers routinely offer
64 Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 831-32
(1994).
65 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 68-71; DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN
UNDERWORLD: THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN POLICE, 1800-1887,
12-40 (1979); THOMAS A. REPPETTO, THE BLUE PARADE 2-23 (1978); JAMES F. RICHARDSON, URBAN
POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES 6-15, 19-32 (1974); SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 49-51 (1st ed. 1980).
66 See, e.g., ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 22-35 (1977); SAMUEL WALKER, A
CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM: THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM 15-18, 20-21 (1977).67 See, e.g., FOGELSON, supra note 66, at 41-53; WALKER, supra note 66, at 56-68.6' 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
69 See Thomas Y. Davies, How the Post-Framing Adoption of the Bare-Probable-Cause
Standard Drastically Expanded Government Arrest and Search Power, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1, 54-56 (Summer 2010,.
70 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
71 See Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v.
Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REv. 299, 330-37 (2010); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and
Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1739, 1804-05 (2000); Thomas, supra note 55, at 1514-16.72 See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills:
Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862,
1865-70 (2010).
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indemnification to their employees." For another, a doctrine of official immunity
from tort liability gradually emerged.74 As currently understood, it grants officers
a qualified immunity for unconstitutional conduct that does not violate clearly
established law.75  Qualified immunity is justified by the potential for over-
deterrence if public employees were strictly liable for their constitutional torts.76
One of the most potent charges against the use of framing-era practice to
interpret the Constitution is that it "depends on using history without historicism,
the use of evidence from the past without paying attention to historical context."77
For an illustration, consider Tennessee v. Garner,7 8 in which the Court invalidated
a statute codifying the framing-era rule that deadly force may be used to stop a
fleeing felon by reasoning that considerations justifying the framing-era rule had
been rendered obsolete. 79 The framing-era rule, the Court observed, was adopted
when "virtually all felonies were punishable by death" and justified by "the
relative dangerousness of felons," but since then, most felonies have become
noncapital and many nondangerous offenses have become classified as felonies.80
Moreover, arrests were inherently dangerous affairs in the framing era before the
advent of modem weaponry.8 1  Now that the arrest of suspected felons cannot
always be regarded as involving sufficient danger to warrant use of deadly force,
"changes in the legal and technological context mean the rule is distorted almost
beyond recognition when literally applied." 82
There are similar perils in embracing the framing-era regime of damages
liability as a remedy for unreasonable search and seizure outside of its historical
context. In the framing era, when any search and seizure undertaken without a
warrant presented a serious risk of personal liability, the use of tort damages to
enforce the limitations on search-and-seizure authority could be expected to work
quite nicely. Although tort liability did not attach to the execution of valid
73 See, e.g., Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not
Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum oflndemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 587, 587, 590-96 (2000); Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages
Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 812-13 & n.51, 819-20
(2007); Martin A. Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed that Municipality Will Indemnify Officer's §
1983 Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1209, 1216-23 (2001).
74 See Kian, supra note 26, at 150-58.
7 See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 203-07 (2001); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 643-44 (1987).
76 See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 407-08 (1997); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.
158, 167-68 (1992); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985).
n7 Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 1185, 1188 (2008). 1
have written elsewhere at greater length about the difficulties ofrelying on framing-era practices and
understandings in contemporary constitutional adjudication. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in
Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1190-209 (2012).
" 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
' Id. at 13.
so Id. at 13-14.
8 Id. at 14-15.
82 Id. at 15.
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warrants, the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause constrained the power of courts
to issue warrants. As William Cuddihy, author of what is likely the most complete
account of the origins of the Fourth Amendment ever written, concluded: "Having
uprooted the paramount cause of the incidents of unreasonable search and seizure
with which they were familiar, the generation of the Fourth Amendment had little
reason to foresee that devices other than the general warrant would someday
imperil the right they sought to protect."83  The principal problem with the
framing-era reliance on tort liability was the risk of over-deterrence created by the
powerful threat of personal liability; but if officials are not expected to perform
much in the way of investigative activity, over-deterrence is not of much concern.
In contrast, in a world in which the police are expected to proactively investigate
crime, over-deterrence becomes a greater concern. And, in a world in which tort
immunities have expanded to prevent over-deterrence, there is little reason to
believe that damages liability can constrain unreasonable search and seizure as in
the framing era.
Professor Amar and the other advocates of the use of framing-era practice to
guide contemporary constitutional interpretation have never attempted a response
to the historicist critique of their reliance on framing-era practice to guide
contemporary search-and-seizure law. Nor does Professor Amar claim that the
Fourth Amendment forbids any evolution from framing-era procedure; to the
contrary, he agrees that the Fourth Amendment is not "some set of specific rules,
frozen in 1791 or 1868 amber." 84 Yet, if that is the case, it is entirely unclear why
we must hew to the framing-era embrace of damages liability if it no longer offers
an adequate remedy for abuse of official authority. Beyond that, since, as Thesis
One explains, the text of the Fourth Amendment tells us nothing about what
remedy should be employed for an unreasonable search and seizure, it is wholly
untenable to read the Fourth Amendment as a codification of the framing-era
remedial regime.
Thesis Two tells us that historical practice cannot resolve the exclusionary
rule debate. This does not mean that the exclusionary rule must be embraced, but
it does mean that judgments about how to enforce the Fourth Amendment must be
made on the basis of the conditions that prevail in today's world, not that of the
Framers.
8 CUDDTHY, supra note 60, at 772. For a similar view, see Kamisar, supra note 40, at 571-
79.
8 AMAR, supra note 19, at 44. For a more general argument that framing-era practices must
be adapted or "translated" in light of contemporary circumstances, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1165, 1174-211 (1992). On this basis, Professor Lessig defends the
exclusionary rule, arguing that the framing-era reliance on damages liability is based on a number of
premises that have been rendered obsolete. See id. at 1228-33. More recently, Stephen Schulhofer
has taken as similar view. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 41, 67-70 (2012).
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III. THESIS THREE: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES AN EFFECTIVE
DETERRENT TO UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Thesis Three is the logical consequence of the preceding theses. As we have
seen in our consideration of Thesis One, there must be some meaningful remedy
for unreasonable search and seizure if the Fourth Amendment is to be more than "a
85haeseform of words." As we have seen in our consideration of Thesis Two, the
original understanding of the Fourth Amendment also suggests that the Framers
likely presumed that there would be an effective remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations; the framing-era damages liability regime quite effectively constrained
unreasonable search and seizure.
Beyond this, Thesis Three follows from the special importance of deterrence
suggested by the constitutional text. The Fourth Amendment recognizes a "right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The term "secure" is often ignored in
discussions of the Fourth Amendment, but it merits particular attention. If the
word "secure" were simply understood as a synonym for a "right" to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure, it would be redundant of the "right" found earlier
in the same clause. The "right" to be "secure" must mean something more.
In the framing era, as Thomas Clancy has demonstrated, the term "secure"
meant pretty much what it means today: "being safe or free from danger."87 This
implies effective ex ante protection of the right against unreasonable search and
seizure-that is, deterrence of unreasonable search and seizure. This suggestion is
strengthened by the fact that the right is not described in individualistic terms, but
instead as a collective right of "the people." If, as Jed Rubenfeld has argued, the
law leaves "the people" in undue fear that they will be subjected to unreasonable
search and seizure, the Fourth Amendment right to be "secure" is not honored.88
Thus, the Fourth Amendment contemplates ex ante protection for the right it
enumerates in a fashion found nowhere else in the Constitution. Absent a remedial
scheme that offers reasonably effective deterrence, the right to be "secure" against
unreasonable search and seizure is breached. Security may not require perfect
deterrence, but surely demands at least reasonable deterrent efficacy. Accordingly,
Thesis Three submits that there must be some remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations that offers sufficient deterrence to comport with the textual guarantee
that the people be "secure" against unreasonable search and seizure. No Member
of the Court has ever offered a different view, nor, to my knowledge, has any
reputable scholar. Indeed, Thesis Three nicely tracks the Court's current
understanding of the function of exclusion; as we have seen, contemporary
85 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
86 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (emphasis supplied).
87 THOMAS K. CLANcY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION §
3.1.2.1, at 47 (2008).
88 See Jed Rubenfeld, The End ofPrivacy, 61 STAN. L. REv. 101, 119-32 (2008).
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doctrine regards the exclusionary rule as a prudential doctrine that endeavors to
give substance to the commands of the Fourth Amendment.89
To be sure, like the first two theses, Thesis Three does not demand use of the
exclusionary rule. It does, however, require some reasonably effective deterrent.
Selecting the appropriate deterrent, in turn, is a classic instance of what Henry
Monaghan dubbed "constitutional common law," using the exclusionary rule as a
primary example. 90 The first three theses tell us that the Fourth Amendment
commands use of an adequate deterrent, but beyond that, its text and history is of
no help.
IV. THESIS FOUR: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE OFFERS SOME MEANINGFUL
DETERRENCE OF UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE BECAUSE OF THE
POLITICAL COSTS OF EXCLUSION
One might be reluctant to accept Thesis Four given the powerful attacks that
have been launched at the deterrent efficacy of exclusion. For example, critics of
exclusion note that it cannot deter searches undertaken for reasons other than
obtaining evidence for a criminal prosecution and, accordingly, cannot deter
abusive tactics with other objectives, such as harassment.9' Moreover, given the
complexity of Fourth Amendment doctrine, critics argue that there is reason to
doubt whether officers understand it sufficiently to be capable of being deterred.92
The deterrent efficacy of exclusion is also blunted, critics argue, because it is
utilized in judicial proceedings as a defense to a criminal prosecution rather than as
a sanction directly imposed on the wrongdoer.93 Indeed, conventional deterrence
theory suggests that exclusion is, at best, a weak deterrent; whenever the likelihood
that a search will produce admissible evidence is more than negligible, exclusion
89 See supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
9o See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1975).
91 See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 233-36 (1977); STEVEN
R. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 56-57
(1977); Francis A. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 37-40; Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An
Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937 (1983); Tonja Jacobi, The Law
and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 602-07 (2011); Dallin H.
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 720-24 (1970);
Slobo in, supra note 32, at 374-75.
See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 91, at 600-01; Oaks, supra note 91, at 731; L. Timothy Perrin
et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule-A New and Extensive Empirical
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for a Civil Administrative Remedy to Partially Replace the
Rule, 83 IOWA L. REv. 669, 676 (1998).
9 See, e.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 91, at 223-24; SCHLESINGER, supra note 91, at 57-58;
WILLIAM J. STUNTz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 220 (2011); Barnett, supra note
91, at 957; Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 Nw. U.L. REV. 1609,
1625-26 (2012); Caldwell & Chase, supra note 19, at 54-56; William T. Pizzi, The Need to Overrule
Mapp v. Ohio, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 679, 709-11 (2011); Slobogin, supra note 32, at 376-79.
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fails to eliminate whatever incentive otherwise exists to undertake search and
seizure because it imposes no penalty on an officer for conducting an illegal
search.94
The deterrent efficacy of the exclusionary rule is ultimately an empirical and
not theoretical question, but the available empirical evidence is anything but clear.
Some studies performed not long after Mapp endeavored to measure its effects and
claimed that exclusion had produced deterrence,95 although others doubted its
96deterrent efficacy. One even found that deterrence varied by city, perhaps
because of local variations in police culture and response to Mapp.9 7
Some additional insight can be gleaned from data on compliance with the
Fourth Amendment. The available data on search warrants, for example, show that
94 See, e.g., Michael D. Cicchini, An Economics Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule and
Deterrence, 75 Mo. L. REv. 459, 469-70 (2010); Jacobi, supra note 91, at 615-17; Jeffrey Standen,
The Exclusionary Rule and Damages: An Economic Comparison of Private Remedies for
Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1443, 1450-57 (2000).
9s See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data
and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681, 703-10 (1973) (finding reductions in
arrests with increased use of warrants in selected cities following adoption of exclusionary rule);
Michael Katz, The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina:
The Model, the Study and Implications, 45 N.C. L. REv. 119, 134 (1966) (survey of police, lawyers,
and judges concluding that exclusion deters); Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REv. 24, 29-30 (1980) (interview with New York police);
Stuart S. Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 283,
283-86 (1965) (same); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. CoLo. L. REV. 75, 85-88, 123-30 (1992)
[hereinafter Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor] (survey of judges, lawyers, and
police finding that exclusion deters); Comment, Effect ofMapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure
Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 87, 92 (1968) (study of arrests
concluding that exclusion deters); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and
Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016, 1054-55
(1987) [hereinafter Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence] (survey of police finding that
exclusion deters). But see generally Perrin et al., supra note 92, at 679-94, 698-701 (criticizing
studies finding deterrence).
96 See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 224-25, 228 (1966) (observational
study of officers); Perrin et al., supra note 92, at 727-30 (surveys of officers showing they frequently
cannot correctly apply Fourth Amendment rules); Oaks, supra note 91, at 706-09 (studying statistics
on arrest, conviction, recovery of stolen property and contraband and motions to suppress evidence in
selected cities); James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule
and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 276-77 (1973) (studying motions to suppress evidence in
Chicago). Cf William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule: The Problem ofPolice Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311,
356-59 (1991) (finding exclusion is only a weak deterrent based on surveys of officers showing they
frequently cannot correctly apply Fourth Amendment rules). But see generally Critique, On the
Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research
and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 740, 744-64 (1975) (questioning the methodology
of studies doubting the deterrent effect of exclusion).
9 See Bradley C. Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies at the State and
Federal Levels: The Case of the Exclusionary Rule, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57, 74-77 (1977).
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they lead to the recovery of evidence in a vast majority of cases.98 If anything, this
suggests that the threat of exclusion over-deters; after all, the Supreme Court tells
us that the standard of probable cause required for issuance of a warrant means
only "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found," and
"requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual
showing of such activity."99 But data involving searches authorized by warrants
are likely misleading. There are costs involved in seeking and then executing
warrants, which may discourage police from their use even apart from the threat of
exclusion.'00 This is suggested by data showing that the success rates for warrants
that involve particularly significant costs to obtain and execute-warrants
authorizing wiretaps-are unusually high. o
For searches without warrants based on probable cause, the data is relatively
sparse, but at least a handful of surveys of searches of automobiles and their
passengers suggest that the search success rate sometimes dips below 40%.102 This
might suggest, at most, modest under-deterrence. Perhaps greater under-deterrence
is suggested by the data relating to stop-and-frisk, which comports with the Fourth
Amendment "where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous,"103 a standard less rigorous than probable cause.' 04  The best data
available comes from the New York Attorney General's study of forms
documenting investigative detentions filed by New York City police officers,
which found through a sampling procedure that 15.4% of all forms failed to
articulate facts sufficient to justify the stop and 23.5% of all forms did not provide
sufficient information to make a determination about whether the stop was
justified.105 The sampling procedure also found that forms that articulated facts
amounting to reasonable suspicion were four times more likely to produce an
arrest. 06 Yet, it is difficult to know what to make of these data; it may well be that
98 See, e.g., Donald Dripps, The Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule, and the Roberts
Court: Normative and Empirical Dimensions of the Over-Deterrence Hypothesis, 85 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 209, 225-26 (2010); Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L.
REv. 913, 922-23 (2008).
9 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 244 n.13 (1983).1oo See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 11, at 926-27.
101 See Minzner, supra note 98, at 926-28.
102 See id. at 925 (describing studies showing a 35.1% success rate in San Antonio, 52.5%
success rate in searches by the Maryland State Police, and 38.2% success rate for searches by the
Florida State Highway Patrol).
103 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
04 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 123-24 (2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1990); United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7 (1989); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227-29 (1985).
1os ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP AND FRISK" PRACTICES:
A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
158-64 (1999) [hereinafter "STOP AND FRISK REPORT"].
"o6 Id. at 164.
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officers were less thorough in filling out forms when they knew there would be no
criminal case arising from the encounter. Reliance on these reports to assess
compliance with the Fourth Amendment is especially perilous because the reports
are not made for that purpose but rather as a source of investigative leads.'0 7 To be
sure, only about one in nine stops led to an arrest, but as the study cautioned,
the fact that a large number of "stops" did not result in an arrest is
not evidence of poor policing . . . . [A]n officer need only have
reasonable suspicion to "stop" an individual; it is not surprising
that, given this lower threshold, many such "stops" should fail to
result in an actual arrest. 08
The difficulties in gathering evidence on compliance with the Fourth
Amendment are illustrated as well by a study of another city involving observation
of officers on patrol that found 46% of pat-down searches were unconstitutional.o 9
Yet, the study also found, in contrast to the New York data, that "unconstitutional
searches were statistically no more likely to generate contraband than were
constitutional searches."o10 If the presence of reasonable suspicion did not increase
the likelihood of finding contraband, the problem may lie in the observers'
understanding of the reasonable suspicion standard; otherwise, it is difficult to
understand how the presence of reasonable suspicion could have no effect on the
likelihood that a search will produce contraband."'
All of this might make one hesitant to reach any conclusions at all about the
deterrent efficacy of exclusion. In its most thorough exploration of this issue to
date, the Supreme Court despaired of identifying reliable evidence on the deterrent
effects of exclusion in light of the many methodological problems that face those
who seek to study the effects of exclusion on police behavior. 12 Yet, one can
indulge all of the doubt that this tangle of data engenders and still accept Thesis
Four. That is because the empirical debate centers on the magnitude of the
exclusion's deterrent effects; there is little debate about whether exclusion has
some deterrent effect. After all, no one believes that police departments could
107 See James J. Fyfe, Stops, Frisks, Searches, and the Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL'Y 379, 392-94 (2004).
'08 STOP AND FRISK REPORT, supra note 105, at 111. A study of stops in 2006 found that
approximately 10% resulted in an arrest or summons. See GREG RIDGEWAY, RAND CORP., ANALYSIS
OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT'S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK
PRACTICES 43 (2007). For a more extensive discussion of the New York data and the difficulties that
inhere in efforts to use it to assess constitutional compliance, see Rosenthal, supra note 71, at 347-
53.
' See Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior
under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 315, 333 (2004).
"o Id. at 347.
'ts For an additional critical discussion of this study, see Fyfe, supra note 107, at 384-91.
112 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449-52 (1976). For a more recent but equally
skeptical account of the deterrent efficacy of exclusion, see Eugene R. Milhizer, Debunking Five
Great Myths about the Exclusionary Rule, 211 MIL. L. REv. 211, 227-32 (2012).
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ignore the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in the face of the exclusionary
rule; the political consequences of seeing case after case of criminals going free
because the police do not concern themselves with the Fourth Amendment would
surely be unacceptable.
Consider what the superintendent of the New York Police Department at the
time of Mapp wrote:
I can think of no decision in recent times . . . which had such a
dramatic and traumatic effect . . . . As the then commissioner of
the largest police force in this country I was immediately caught
up in the entire problem of reevaluating our procedures . . . and
creating new policies and new instructions for the implementation
of Mapp.13
There are many similar anecdotes; for example, the adoption of the
exclusionary rule in California immediately provoked police departments to place
unprecedented emphasis on Fourth Amendment compliance.1 4  When the
Supreme Court repudiated its earlier holdings that had permitted the search of an
arrestee's house incident to arrest in Chimel v. California, 1 5 police policy on
search incident to arrest throughout the country transformed dramatically."' 6 After
the Court prohibited random stops of motorists to check their licenses and
registration in Delaware v. Prouse,"7 the District of Columbia Police Department
almost immediately overhauled its policies to comply with the new ruling."'8 More
recently, after the Court held that the installation and subsequent use of a GPS
device to monitor a vehicle's movements was a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment in United States v. Jones,1 9 the FBI's general counsel reported
that the decision caused the agency to turn off nearly 3,000 monitoring devices.'20
The explanation for this pattern is not mysterious. The exclusionary rule
requires the authorities to concern themselves with Fourth Amendment
requirements if they are to successfully prosecute wrongdoers. Few doubt, in turn,
that when police policy encourages compliance with the Fourth Amendment, rates
113 Michael J. Murphy, Judicial Review ofPolice Methods in Law Enforcement-The Problem
of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEX. L. REv. 939, 941 (1966).
114 See Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A
Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 565, 587-88 (1955).
i"s 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
116 See Canon, supra note 95, at 716-17.
"' 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
1 See William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, Foreword: The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 399-401
(1981).
"9 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
120 See Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Ruling Prompts FBI to Turn Off 3,000 Tracking
Devices, ABC NEWS, Mar. 7, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/supreme-court-
ruling-prompts-fbi-to-turn-off-3000-tracking-devices.
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of compliance rise. For example, the few empirical studies of the question have
found that training improves police compliance with the Fourth Amendment.121
Conversely, absent exclusion, the incentive of the police to comply with the Fourth
Amendment would be reduced. As David Sklansky observed, after the
exclusionary rule was abolished in California as a remedy for violations of the
California Constitution's analogue to the Fourth Amendment, police officers in
that state were trained to ignore state constitutional restrictions on search and
seizure not also embodied in Fourth Amendment law.122
Anthony Amsterdam authored what may be the classic argument about the
effect of exclusion on police incentives:
[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to operate in the manner of the
procedure now being used in some appliance stores with the
encouragement of police authorities: branding the social security
number of the purchaser into the chassis of new television sets in
order to make them less attracti[v]e as objects of larceny by
diminishing their resale value in the hands of anyone but the true
owner. Of course a branded television set may nonetheless be
stolen . . . . But at least the effort to depreciate its worth makes it
less of an incitement than it might be. A criminal court system
functioning without an exclusionary rule ... is the equivalent of a
government purchasing agent paying premium prices for evidence
branded with the stamp of unconstitutionality.123
Yet, claiming only that the exclusionary rule reduces the incentive the
authorities would otherwise have to engage in unreasonable search and seizure
misses something important. Exclusion imposes a cost, albeit political in
character, on law-enforcement agencies that ignore Fourth Amendment
requirements. Because exclusion means that the criminal may well go free when
the constable blunders, exclusion makes it politically costly for the authorities to
breach Fourth Amendment rules.124 Indeed, Daryl Levinson has argued that the
political costs imposed when exclusion frees the guilty is an important virtue
because the government is likely to be highly responsive to political costs and
121 See, e.g., Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 96, at 337-38; Perrin et al., supra note 92, at
730-32.
122 See David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567,
580-81 (2008).
1 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
431-32(1974).
124 For an elaboration along these lines, see Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 118, at 396-
406.
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benefits.12 5 For their part, even opponents of exclusion acknowledge that it is
likely to produce some measure of deterrence.126
Thesis Four does not demand that we embrace the exclusionary rule. There
may well be alternatives to exclusion that are equally or more effective deterrents
and have fewer adverse consequences. Thesis Four, however, establishes that
there is no real dispute about whether exclusion has a deterrent effect. As long as
government remains politically accountable for its performance, it cannot afford to
allow criminals to go free by permitting constables to blunder.
The first four theses are relatively uncontroversial, not so the remaining three.
Yet, the soundness of these four strongly suggests the remaining three. Consider
first the exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
V. THESIS FIVE: EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT IS NOT INVARIABLY REQUIRED To PRESERVE ITS
DETERRENT EFFICACY
The Supreme Court has carved out a number of exceptions to exclusion in
contexts in which the Court has judged the deterrent value of the rule to be
exceeded by its costs in terms of the loss of probative evidence.' 27  Viewed in
terms of conventional deterrence, these exceptions to exclusion are deeply
problematic. As we have seen, the exclusionary rule imposes no direct cost on an
officer undertaking a search and seizure, and if there is some expected benefit to
unlawful search and seizure because it may fall into one of the exceptions to
exclusion, then it would seem that an officer would have an incentive to search
even in the face of a likely Fourth Amendment violation. Indeed, some
commentators have complained that the Court's willingness to recognize
exceptions to exclusion has unduly compromised its deterrent efficacy.128 In this
125 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345,417 (2000).
126 See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 91, at 56 ("There can be no doubt that a certain number
of illegal acts are deterred by the rule, for many law officials must be reluctant to gather evidence
which will be of no value in court."); Oaks, supra note 91, at 708 ("The exclusionary rule has
contributed to an increased awareness of constitutional requirements by the police."); Perrin et al.,
supra note 92, at 710-11 ("Mapp has probably made officers more aware of the Fourth Amendment,
and has increased the number of warrants they obtain . . . .").
127 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (reasonable reliance on existing
law); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (reasonable reliance on report of outstanding
warrant); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (failure to comply with knock-and-announce
requirement); Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (parole revocation
proceedings); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (reasonable reliance on statute); INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (deportation proceedings); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984) (reasonable reliance on warrant); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (collateral attack on
convictions); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (civil tax proceedings).
128 See, e.g., MACLIN, supra note 32, at 342-47; Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court
Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment "Search and
Seizure" Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933, 1030-34 (2010); David J.R. Frakt, Fruitless
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vein, when, in Herring v. United States,129 the Court concluded that exclusion
should be triggered only by "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or
in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence,"l 30 Justice Ginsburg, in
dissent, objected that this "suggestion runs counter to a foundational premise of
tort law-that liability for negligence, i.e., lack of due care, creates an incentive to
act with greater care."' 3 1
This type of argument, however, overlooks the differences between the
mechanism by which tort law and the exclusionary rule achieve deterrence.
Negligence liability is thought to deter tortious conduct by creating an economic
incentive to make cost-justified investments in safety. 13 2  Police officers lack
similar incentives; as Donald Dripps has observed, "[i]ndividual officers do not
internalize either the benefits or the costs of Fourth Amendment activity." 3 3
Instead, officers experience only indirect costs and benefits to the extent that their
superiors reward or punish search and seizure activity. The exclusionary rule, in
turn, influences this distribution of costs and benefits by exacting a political cost
on Fourth Amendment violations, as we have seen in our consideration of Thesis
Four. Thus, as Professor Dripps explained, the exclusionary rule "influences
street-level behavior primarily by giving police administrators incentives to train
and discipline the force to comply with constitutional requirements." 34
Accordingly, exclusion achieves deterrence by altering political rather than
economic incentives. It follows that even if there are limitations on the scope of
the exclusionary rule, as long as it remains sufficiently robust so that the political
consequences of permitting officers to ignore Fourth Amendment constraints are
unacceptable, the rule achieves deterrence. Thus, it is likely that the exclusionary
rule could tolerate a regime of considerably less than automatic exclusion; indeed,
one scholar has even argued that exclusion could be required in only a random
sample of cases involving Fourth Amendment violations without unduly
compromising deterrence.' 35
Poisonous Trees in a Parallel Universe: Hudson v. Michigan, Knock-and-Announce, and the
Exclusionary Rule, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 659, 715-30 (2007); David Gray, Meagan Cooper &
David McAloon, The Supreme Court's Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REv. 7, 46-
47 (2012); Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Exclusionary Rule Redux-Again, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873,
886-87 (2010).
129 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
1o Id. at 144.
131 Id. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For a particularly helpful discussion of the
implications of Herring, see Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009).
132 See, e.g., GULDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS
135-73 (1970); RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.1 (4th ed. 1992); STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5-32 (1987).
Dripps, supra note 46, at 763.
134 Id. at 764.
13s See Eugene Milhizer, The Exclusionary Rule Lottery, 39 U. TOL. L. REv. 755, 761-63
(2008).
546 [Vol 10:2
2013] SEVEN THESES IN GRUDGING DEFENSE 547
Some have suggested that a Fourth Amendment violation should produce a
reduction in the defendant's sentence rather than complete exclusion of the
evidence that might prevent conviction.' This approach, however, might
undermine deterrence overmuch. As William Stuntz once argued, the power of the
exclusionary rule as a deterrent is that it "shines a spotlight on a few of the robbers
and drug dealers who go free."' 37 If a Fourth Amendment violation failed to result
in such a dramatic consequence, the political incentive to comply with the Fourth
Amendment might be seriously compromised. Other proposals to trim back
exclusion are even more likely to unacceptably undermine deterrence. Consider,
for example, proposals that seek to reduce the social costs of exclusion by
rendering it inapplicable to what are regarded as the most serious crimes.' These
proposals are notable for their failure to consider the political mechanism by which
exclusion achieves deterrence. It is the threat of the criminal going free in the most
serious cases that has the greatest political salience; this is where the deterrent
punch of the exclusionary rule primarily resides.139
Thus, Thesis Five submits that exclusion need not be automatic or universal,
though it must be sufficiently robust to preserve the political incentive that
exclusion creates to comply with Fourth Amendment requirements.140
136 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 115-
17 (2003); Caldwell & Chase, supra note 19, at 72-76.
' William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 443, 447 (1997).
138 See, e.g., James Duke Cameron & Richard Lustiger, The Exclusionary Rule: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 101 F.R.D. 109, 144-45 (1984); John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1046-49 (1974).
139 For additional discussion of the problems with making the exclusionary rule inapplicable to
particular categories of search and seizure, see Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and
the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19-32 (1987), and Milhizer, supra
note 135, at 760-62.
140 Cf James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 313-19 (1990) (requiring exclusion of evidence
impeaching the testimony of defense witnesses to avoid unduly undermining the deterrent function of
the exclusionary rule). One could use Thesis Five to object to the holding that the exclusionary rule
is inapplicable to knock-and-announce violations in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), on the
ground that it eviscerates the rule's deterrent effect for this category of Fourth Amendment violations.
For an argument along these lines, see James J. Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and the Future of
Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1819, 1868-71 (2008). Yet, given that the police can
dispense with knock-and-announce when they reasonably suspect that it would be dangerous, futile,
or inhibit their investigation, see Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1997), the incentive
to violate the requirement may not be great, especially since compliance enhances officers' safety by
reducing the risk that officers will be mistaken for intruders. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301, 313 n.12 (1958). Thus, there may be little deterrent benefit to exclusion, as the Court
suggested. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596.
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VI. THESIS Six: EXCLUSION IS SOMETIMES REQUIRED To ACHIEVE
CONSTITUTIONALLY SUFFICIENT DETERRENCE EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF
CULPABLE MISCONDUCT
As we have seen in our consideration of Thesis Five, the holding in Herring
that exclusion ordinarily requires culpable misconduct can be reconciled with
Thesis Three's requirement that there be a remedy with adequate deterrent efficacy
for Fourth Amendment violations. On this basis, Davis v. United Statesl4 1 seems
unobjectionable as well. In that case, the Court held that exclusion is not required
when a search is undertaken in reliance on then-existing law, even though it was
subsequently repudiated by an intervening decision of the Court.142 After all, the
search in Davis was consistent with existing law, and there is no reason to deter
officers from undertaking search and seizure in reasonable reliance on existing
law. This reasoning suggests, in turn, that even when the law is unsettled at the
time of a search and seizure, as long as the officer could reasonably believe that the
search and seizure is lawful, suppression is inappropriate.143 Accordingly, this
view precludes suppression of evidence obtained in any search undertaken in
reasonable reliance on existing law even when a motion to suppress evidence
endeavors to clarify or alter existing law.
If exclusion could never be used to clarify or change Fourth Amendment law,
however, the resulting remedial scheme would ossify the law of search and seizure.
This, in turn, would create great tension with Thesis Three's insistence that there
be an efficacious remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.
History teaches that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence necessarily evolves.
For one thing, the Supreme Court is not infallible; sometimes the Court must
correct its mistakes, as when the Court overruled an earlier decision permitting a
search of an arrestee's house incident to arrest and instead concluded that the
officer-safety rationale that supports a search incident to arrest extends only to the
area within the arrestee's immediate control.'" For another, sometimes the lower
courts over-read the Court's decisions; this was the view the Court took when it
changed the law on which the officers had relied in Davis, repudiating the view
many lower courts had taken that that the Court's precedents permitted a search of
the entire passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to an arrest of a recent
occupant.145  Beyond correcting judicial error, Fourth Amendment doctrine
necessarily develops over time. Even relatively mature doctrine retains areas
141 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
142 Id. at 2428-29.
143 Id. at 2439-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For arguments in support of this view, see, for
example, WILLIAM T. PiZZi, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS HAS
BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED To Do To REBUILD IT 25-45 (1999), Sharon L.
Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion-A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 1275, 1329-34 (2000),
and Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929,
951-53 (1965).
'" See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760-68 (1969).
145 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 341-43 (2009).
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where the law is unsettled; for example, the Court did not decide until 1980 that
the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant in order to make a forcible entry to
effect an otherwise valid arrest of an individual in his residence.146 Even today, it
remains unsettled whether a warrant is required to make a forcible entry into a
home if a resident has already granted consent to an undercover informant who
then observes contraband in plain view.14 7 Doctrinal evolution is required as well
by changed circumstances, such as technological advance. For example, in the
framing era, only a physical trespass was thought to be an unlawful invasion of the
privacy of the home, and for that reason, in its first encounter with electronic
surveillance, the Court held that wiretapping unaccompanied by a physical trespass
to the home was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.14 8
The Court subsequently repudiated this rule, holding that even nontrespassory
wiretapping fell within the scope of the Fourth Amendment even if it involved no
trespass to a home.149 The Court later held that the use of a thermal imaging
device that, although positioned on public property outside of a home, discloses
"the relative heat of various rooms in the home," 50 also amounts to a "search"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, rejecting the contrary view taken by
lower courts by explaining that it could not "permit police technology to erode the
privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment."' 5 1 More recently, the Court held
that the installation and subsequent use of a GPS device to monitor a vehicle's
movements was a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 152
If, however, the exclusionary rule could no longer be used to change or
develop Fourth Amendment law because exclusion is not permitted whenever
officers reasonably rely on existing law, this limitation on exclusion would
contravene Thesis Three's insistence that the Fourth Amendment requires a
remedy sufficient to protect the people's right to security against unreasonable
search and seizure. Instead, no remedy would be available for violations involving
novel Fourth Amendment claims, and Fourth Amendment doctrine could not
evolve.
To be sure, the exclusionary rule is not the only vehicle for the development
of Fourth Amendment law. Actions can be brought seeking injunctive relief, but
the plaintiff faces a high hurdle; the plaintiff must establish a credible and
nonspeculative threat that he will be subjected in the future to an allegedly
146 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
147 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243-45 (2009).
148 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463-66 (1928).
149 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
Iso Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001).
.s. Id. at 34. For additional examples of the evolution of Fourth Amendment law, see Albert
W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 489-95
(2009). Orin Kerr has provided a contemporary example of evolution still underway, noting that it is
at present unclear how Fourth Amendment standards apply to the search and seizure of email. See
Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v.
Greene and Davis v. United States, 2010-2011 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 237, 256-57 (2011).152 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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unreasonable search and seizure. 53 As for actions seeking damages, sovereign
immunity bars suits seeking a remedy for an alleged constitutional violation
against the federal government,154 and the Court has held that Congress has not
acted to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity against damages liability.' 5 Suit
can be brought against individual officers seeking damages for Fourth Amendment
violations,'56 but, as we have seen, these suits face the defense of qualified
immunity, which precludes liability except when an official has violated clearly
established law.' 57  Under this doctrine, whenever Fourth Amendment law is
unsettled as applied to an official's conduct, damages are unavailable. 58
Accordingly, in any cases in which an officer reasonably relies on existing
law, qualified immunity likely precludes damages liability.159 Damages actions
against municipalities, in contrast, do not face the defense of qualified
immunity, 1o but municipalities can be held liable only for municipal custom,
policy, or practice.'6 ' This is a demanding standard; municipalities can be held
liable only when municipal custom, policy, or practice is itself unconstitutional, or
when municipal policymakers exhibit deliberate indifference to violations of
constitutional rights by municipal employees. 162 If municipal policymakers merely
adopt a policy of undertaking search and seizure whenever there is reasonable
support for its legality under then-existing law, it is far from clear that there is any
basis for municipal liability. Even an injunctive action against a municipality
requires proof of an actionable municipal custom, policy, or practice. 63
To be sure, in a civil action, a court could express a view on the merits on a
Fourth Amendment issue even if it also concludes that the action is barred by
qualified immunity, although it is not required to do so.'6 There is, however,
reason to doubt whether courts will be willing to reach the merits of Fourth
Amendment claims that can be quickly disposed of on other grounds, such as
153 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-10 (1983).
154 See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994).
1ss See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-45 (1979).
156 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97
(1971) (federal officers); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961) (officers acting under color
of state law), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
157 See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
158 See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377-79 (2009);
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243-45 (2009).
159 See Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, Ill COLUM. L. REv. 670, 710-13 (2011).
'6 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980).
11 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
162 See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-11 (1997); City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 386-89 (1989).163 See Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447,452-54 (2011).
16 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241-42 (2009). At one point, the Court seemingly
required that the merits be addressed prior to reaching immunity, see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
201 (2001), but it later changed course, leaving the matter entirely within judicial discretion. See
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 242.
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qualified immunity or an exception to the exclusionary rule. The available
empirical data suggests that since the Court left the matter to the discretion of the
lower courts, their willingness to reach the merits has declined significantly, at
least in precedential courts issuing decisions with binding effect.165 Perhaps even
more important, if pressing even a possibly meritorious Fourth Amendment claim
can do nothing for a litigant, either because, in a criminal case, the claim involves a
novel or unsettled area of the law in which exclusion would be inappropriate, or, in
a civil case, the claim cannot produce a favorable judgment because of qualified
immunity, we should not expect counsel to have an incentive to invest much in
support of such claims. Although counsel might not be deterred from pursuing
damages claims merely because the award is likely to be small because of the
availability of attorney's fees for prevailing parties under the civil rights laws,6 6 if
a plaintiff can do no more than obtain a favorable statement while losing a case on
grounds of qualified immunity, a plaintiff cannot recover attorney's fees because
of the rule that fees are unavailable for obtaining "a favorable judicial statement of
law in the course of litigation that results in judgment against the plaintiff. ... "
To be sure, there are some clients and lawyers with primarily ideological agendas
that may be willing to seek purely ideological victories (such as establishing
precedents for future litigation), but the fact that counsel and client can obtain little
tangible value when pursuing a claim likely barred by the exclusionary rule or
qualified immunity-and are not even guaranteed a ruling on the merits-suggests
that such a rule is likely to stunt the development of Fourth Amendment law. 168
165 See Colin Rolfs, Comment, Qualified Immunity after Pearson v. Callahan, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 468, 490-98 (2011).
166 Cf Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597-98 (2006) (noting the incentive to bring even
cases involving small damages created by the recoverability of attorney's fees).167 Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 763 (1987).
168 One scholar has suggested that qualified immunity doctrine be reformed to permit a
plaintiff to seek nominal damages without facing an immunity bar so that qualified immunity does
not stunt the development of constitutional law. See James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified
Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, Ill COLUM. L. Rcv. 1601,
1623-31 (2011). Although the proposal spares defendants exposure to substantial damages, it
nevertheless undermines a core protection of qualified immunity by forcing defendants to bear the
cost of defending litigation. The Court has rejected approaches to qualified immunity that fail to
achieve this objective. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-30 (1985) (permitting
defendants to appeal interlocutory rulings denying qualified immunity to spare them the burdens of
litigating claims barred by immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982) (rejecting
requirement that defendants establish good faith to receive immunity because it frequently prevents
the termination of otherwise insubstantial claims prior to trial). Moreover, this proposal does not
address the problem of incentive to litigate; nominal damages provide little of substance to the client
and will not support an award of attorneys' fees. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114-16 (1992).
But, even putting these problems aside, it is entirely unclear why the defendant would agree to bear
the substantial costs of litigating such claims instead of merely agreeing to the entry of judgment
against them for nominal damages. The proposal's advocate asserts that it would be politically
unacceptable to take this course of action, see Pfander, supra at 1636-38, but it is rarely politically
unacceptable to take a course of action that saves the taxpayers money, especially when this course of
action would not produce a binding precedent inasmuch as decisions of district courts are not
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Indeed, a number of scholars have expressed concern that absent a vigorous
exclusionary remedy, the development of Fourth Amendment law is likely to be
stunted.'69 Notably, one recent empirical study concluded that the vast majority of
Fourth Amendment law is made in criminal and not civil cases.170
As we have seen in our consideration of Thesis Three, the Fourth Amendment
demands a remedy for unreasonable search and seizure with adequate deterrent
efficacy. One method of achieving deterrence is when the remedy of exclusion
becomes a vehicle for announcing or clarifying rules of Fourth Amendment law.
As Albert Alschuler put it, exclusion "does not operate primarily by altering a
short-term pleasure-pain calculus .. . . It works over the long term by allowing
judges to give guidance to police officers who ultimately prove willing to receive
it."' 7 ' This view, moreover, is in no tension with Davis. Although there are
advantages in terms of equity in applying a new rule of law to all cases pending at
the time the new rule is announced,172 the prospective deterrent benefits of
announcing the new rule are achieved merely by its promulgation; there is no
additional deterrent value in applying the new rule to other pending cases to justify
the windfall that such application would confer on lawbreakers. In contrast, when
a litigant seeks alteration or clarification of existing law through a motion to
suppress evidence and ultimately prevails, that victory produces deterrence by
requiring the authorities to adhere to the new rule prospectively. Thus, permitting
the first litigant to prevail on a novel claim by excluding evidence provides
litigants with a powerful incentive to develop Fourth Amendment law, and in this
fashion produces deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations. To be sure, limiting
exclusion to the first litigant to prevail on a novel claim would reduce the benefits
conferred on defendants by such claims, but given the incentive of defense counsel
to vigorously defend their clients, the promise of exclusion in the first case to the
post ought to be a sufficient incentive to bring such cases.
Davis does not reject the possibility of preserving exclusion in the first case to
the post. It leaves open the possibility that "to prevent Fourth Amendment law
from becoming ossified," the first litigant to obtain "the overruling of one of this
regarded as binding precedents. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011). In
contrast, choosing to litigate the merits through an appeal could produce such a precedent. Indeed,
there is little reason to credit the speculation that governmental defendants feel obligated to litigate
constitutional claims; to the contrary, there is substantial empirical evidence that governmental
defendants are willing to settle even quite serious claims. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright,
Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BuFF. L. REv. 757, 766-74
(2004).
169 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 151, at 495-511; John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing The Order
of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 Sup. CT. REv. 115, 131-33 (2009); Kerr, supra note 151, at
239-45, 253-56; Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REv.
687, 717-33 (2011).
170 See Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REv. 405, 428 (2012).
1 Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v. Michigan and Its
Ancestors, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1741, 1752 (2008) (footnotes omitted).172 See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987).
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Court's Fourth Amendment precedents should be given the benefit of the victory
by permitting the suppression of evidence in that one case."' 73 Justice Sotomayor
added that Davis "d[id] not present the markedly different question whether the
exclusionary rule applies when the law governing the constitutionality of a
particular search is unsettled."l 74 There is great merit to preserving exclusion in
such cases; such an approach is dictated by the constitutional requirement posited
by Thesis Three of a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations with deterrent
efficacy.
Nevertheless, like Thesis Three, Thesis Six supports exclusion only if there is
no other remedy available with adequate deterrent efficacy. It is to the subject of
alternate remedies that we finally turn.
VII. THESIS SEVEN: THE ALTERNATIVES TO EXCLUSION ARE OF UNCERTAIN
EFFICACY BECAUSE THEY REST ON PROBLEMATIC THEORIES OF DETERRENCE
It is easy to understand the case against the exclusionary rule given the many
attacks against it. Foremost among them, as we have seen, is the complaint that
exclusion produces a windfall for the guilty.175  There have been a number of
efforts to assess the magnitude of this effect, with some doubting that the rule has a
significant effect on prosecutions,' 76 and others disagreeing. 77  The issue is
enormously difficult to study; perhaps the exclusionary rule's principal costs
include when officers refrain from undertaking search and seizure or from
presenting a case for prosecution, or when prosecutors refuse to accept a case or
agree to a lenient negotiated disposition in light of a probability of exclusion, but
measuring these effects encompasses great difficulties. As Thomas Davies once
concluded, "the measurement problems involved are such that we will not obtain
anything like a precise count of its effects." 7 8
' Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (2011).
174 Id at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
'7 See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
76 See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GEN'L OF THE U.S., IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 8-11 (1979); Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know
(and Still Need To Learn) about the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other
Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 678-80 (1983); Peter F. Nardulli, The
Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585,
606-09 (1983); Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions To Suppress and
"Lost Cases:" The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1064-66 (1991).
". See, e.g., NAT'L INST. JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA 18 (1982); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94
IOWA L. REv. 125, 138-41 (2008); Stephen G. Valdes, Comment, Frequency and Success: An
Empirical Study of Criminal Law Defenses, Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea
Negotiations, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1709, 1728 (2005).
178 Davies, supra note 176, at 622. For a more recent summary of the difficulties, see Jacobi,
supra note 91, at 595-99.
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Many respected commentators take the position that losing probative evidence
of guilt is a cost of the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable search
and seizure even if the prohibition results in a loss of probative evidence of guilt,
rather than a cost of the exclusionary rule.'79 Others, however, point out that in
many instances of unreasonable search and seizure, compliance with the Fourth
Amendment would not have entailed the loss of probative evidence, but instead
would merely have required the authorities to follow the proper procedures, such
as obtaining a warrant or additional predication prior to undertaking a search.o80
Yet, this criticism of exclusion fails to come to grips with its deterrent function.
As we have seen in our consideration of Thesis Three, the Fourth Amendment
demands a remedy with sufficient deterrent efficacy to provide the constitutionally
guaranteed "security" against unreasonable search and seizure. If exclusion were
denied whenever one could speculate that the authorities would have obtained the
incriminating evidence even had they complied with the Fourth Amendment,
exclusion would be all too easy to avoid. As one leading scholar put it, the
authorities can often claim, "if we hadn't done it wrong, we would have done it
right."' 8 ' The result, of course, would be to drain the exclusionary rule of its
deterrent efficacy. This, however, is precisely what Thesis Three forbids.
Moreover, the fact that the authorities can often obtain incriminating evidence by
complying with the Fourth Amendment is, in terms of deterrence, a virtue, since
compliance with the Fourth Amendment can facilitate successful prosecution. For
just this reason, exclusion creates a political incentive to comply with Fourth
Amendment requirements.
There remains, however, the question whether an alternative to exclusion
would offer adequate, if not greater deterrence while generating fewer costs. An
alternative remedy with greater deterrent heft can be readily envisioned; as we saw
in our consideration of Thesis Four, although the exclusionary rule surely has some
deterrent effect, there is ample reason to doubt its magnitude. Indeed, given the
many exceptions to exclusion and the lack of any direct sanction on wrongdoers,
most scholars believe that the exclusionary rule is far more likely to under-, rather
than over-deter.' 8 2 This is not the only attack on exclusion that has bite. Critics
179 See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 84, at 68-69; Allen, supra note 91, at 34; Kamisar,
supra note 139, at 31-32; Oaks, supra note 91, at 754; Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and
Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure
Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1392-93 (1983).
180 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 19, at 26-29; Alschuler, supra note 171, at 1758-61; Dripps,
supra note 11, at 919 n.85; Kaplan, supra note 138, at 1038; Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring
Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintifs and Defendants as Private
Attornes General, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 247, 267 n.98 (1988); Slobogin, supra note 32, at 432-33.
',' 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 11.4(a) 272 (4th ed. 2004) (quoting State v. Topanotes, 76 P.3d 1159, 1164 (Utah 2003)). For a
more elaborate argument invoking the law of remedies, see Eric A. Johnson, Causal Relevance in the
Law of Search and Seizure, 88 B.U. L. REv. 113, 156-70 (2008).
182 See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal
Procedure Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281, 2302 (1998) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 19); George
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also complain that exclusion offers no remedy to the innocent,183 and generates
enormous litigation costs including the promotion of perjurious testimony by
officers eager to avoid the loss of probative evidence.184 One scholar has even
theorized that the exclusionary rule leads to the conviction of the innocent by
inducing juries to speculate that probative evidence has been withheld from them,
causing jurors to become more prone to convict.'85  Another speculated that the
exclusionary remedy might encourage defense counsel to focus on exclusion rather
than pursuing defenses based on factual innocence.186 One might also believe that
exclusion leads to over-deterrence, as when officers unnecessarily gather evidence
to support probable cause or seek a warrant.18
Some of these criticisms are more easily answered than others. For example,
the claim that exclusion offers nothing to the innocent overlooks the rule's
deterrent function. As one scholar put it: "[T]he guilty defendant is freed to
protect the rest of us from unlawful police invasions of our security ... "18 Thus,
to the extent that exclusion deters Fourth Amendment violations, it offers quite a
bit to the innocent. To be sure, when search or seizure is undertaken for purposes
other than obtaining evidence, exclusion is unlikely to deter, but as we have seen in
our consideration of Thesis Six, the exclusionary rule is supplemented by damages
liability, at least in some circumstances. 89 Thus, the current regime offers
something tangible to the innocent who experience compensable damages.
C. Thomas III, Judges Are Not Economists and Other Reasons to Be Skeptical of Contingent
Suppression Orders: A Response to Professor Dripps, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 47, 50-51 (2001).
1 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 19, at 27; SCHLESINGER, supra note 91, at 47-50; Jacobi, supra
note 91, at 588; Oaks, supra note 91, at 736-37.
'8 See, e.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 91, at 234-35; SCHLESINGER, supra note 91, at 57; Barnett,
supra note 91, at 958-59; Caldwell & Chase, supra note 19, at 52-53; Jacobi, supra note 91, at 608-
11; Oaks, supra note 91, at 739-49; Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do
About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1037, 1041-48 (1996). Cf Melanie D. Wilson, Improbable Cause: A
Case for Judging Police by a More Majestic Standard, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259, 286-95 (2010)
(using empirical evidence from cases in the District of Kansas to argue that judges have a limited
ability to detect police perjury). With respect to the magnitude of the problem of police perjury, there
have been some efforts to gather empirical evidence that, perhaps unsurprisingly in light of the
obvious difficulties in gathering reliable data, have produced disparate results. Compare, e.g.,
Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor, supra note 95, at 95-98 (concluding the
incidence of perjury is low), with SKOLNICK, supra note 96, at 228 (finding perjury common), Pizzi,
supra note 93, at 715 (same), and Comment, supra note 95, at 94-96 (same).
185 See Jacobi, supra note 91, at 617-46.
116 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5, 37-43 (1997). Professor Slobogin repeats this contention in this
symposium. See Christopher Slobogin, The Exclusionary Rule: Is It on Its Way Out? Should It Be?,
10 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 354-55 (2013).
187 Cf Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595-96 (2006) (speculating that utilizing the
exclusionary rule to enforce the knock-and-announce requirement could cause officers to wait longer
than required after announcing their authority).
8 Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of
Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 331 (1973).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 154-58.
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Similarly, the claim that exclusion produces litigation costs-including police
perjury-must be assessed in light of Thesis Three's insistence on a remedy with
adequate deterrent efficacy. Any remedy with sufficient bite to constitute an
adequate deterrent would likely produce substantial litigation, with the attendant
risk of perjury on the part of those who fear whatever regime of sanctions that
would be employed in order to generate the requisite deterrence. The claim that
exclusion produces over-deterrence has a similar answer. Although, as we have
seen in our consideration of Thesis Four, there is little empirical evidence that the
exclusionary rule over-deters, 190 again, any remedy with sufficient deterrent
efficacy could over-deter as well. Only if a remedy is identified that is less likely
to produce litigation costs or over-deterrence while generating sufficient "security"
against unreasonable search and seizure is there reason to jettison exclusion.
The claim that the exclusionary rule produces wrongful convictions by
causing jurors to assume probative evidence has been excluded, thus giving a
"discount to the prosecutor's burden of proof," 91 has little empirical support.
Although there is evidence that jurors sometimes ignore instructions to disregard
evidence, consider it for a limited purpose, or speculate about facts not in evidence,
and are more likely to disregard instructions that they regard as illegitimate, there
is no evidence that instructions about the prosecution's burden of proof in criminal
cases fall into any of these categories.' 92 It is rather a leap from evidence that
jurors have difficulty ignoring or limiting their consideration of evidence that was
presented, or following instructions that they regard as illegitimate, and even
evidence that the exclusionary rule is unpopular,193 to conclude that jurors will
generally discount the prosecution's burden of proof if they believe that otherwise
probative evidence is sometimes excluded. If this effect exists, moreover, it might
be counterbalanced by the equally plausible inference that jurors are familiar with
the phenomenon of wrongful convictions and, when they must take personal
responsibility for another's liberty, are motivated to resist generalized speculation
that additional incriminating evidence must exist in order to avoid convicting the
innocent.
Most important, however, the available empirical evidence on wrongful
convictions is inconsistent with this claim. If exclusion causes "jurors [to]
systematically overestimate the existence of evidence of guilt against the
innocent,"l 94 we should expect wrongful convictions to fall in an essentially
random pattern, or, at most, cluster in cases involving critical but missing
evidence-such as "a murder trial without a murder weapon when neither side
mentions a search of the defendant's home"' 95-which jurors may speculate has
been suppressed. Yet, the ample research on wrongful convictions shows that the
190 See supra text accompanying notes 95-111.
191 Jacobi, supra note 91, at 632.
192 See id. at 620-27.
'9 See id. at 629.
'94 Id. at 623.
' Id. at 622.
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clear majority involves inaccurate witness identifications, and the remainder
cluster in cases involving inaccurate forensic or informant testimony and false
confessions.'9 6  Thus, the evidence suggests that wrongful convictions are not
associated with juror's hypothesizing about missing evidence, but rather with the
prosecution's use of highly incriminating evidence that proves inaccurate.
As for the theory that exclusion encourages defense counsel to forgo pursuit
of defenses based on factual innocence, it is similarly unsupported by empirical
evidence, and similarly accompanied by the musty scent of the academy. Having
met more than a few defense attorneys in my years in practice, I can say with
confidence that I never met one who would have regarded the notion of pursuing
exclusion at the expense of factual innocence as anything but malpractice. Indeed,
an attorney so incompetent to adopt such a course of action is unlikely to be
capable of mounting a successful defense based on factual innocence irrespective
of the supposed distracting effects of exclusion. As we have seen, wrongful
convictions are most common in cases involving eyewitness, forensic, or informant
testimony and confessions. A defense attorney who would let exclusion distract
him from mounting a challenge to such testimony-assuming that the case even
involved a search and seizure-has a lack of professional judgment that abolition
of the exclusionary rule is not going to supply. To be sure, there are plenty of
incompetent or overworked defense attorneys who fail to fully investigate potential
defenses, but even the originator of this theory acknowledged that "[t]he dearth of
factual investigation by appointed defense counsel is mostly the product of
resource constraints. Even if Fourth and Fifth Amendment law were abolished,
defense lawyers would find it impossible to do a thorough job of representing most
of their clients."197
The charge that the exclusionary rule has insufficient deterrent heft is less
easily answered. Deterrence would seem more likely to result from a regime that
imposed a more direct sanction on violators, such as the threat of criminal
prosecution or internal discipline. Indeed, there have been a number of proposals
to replace the exclusionary rule with more aggressive systems of discipline.' 98
Such a regime offers the additional benefit of obviating the need to exclude
probative evidence of guilt.
196 See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONs Go WRONG 8-10, 14-144 (2011); Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred
Years Later: Wrongful Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
825, 841-58 (2010); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542-46 (2005).
197 Stuntz, supra note 186, at 45.
m9 See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 91, at 72-75; Samuel Eistreicher & Daniel P. Weick,
Opting for a Legislative Alternative to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 78 UMKC L. REV.
949, 960-64 (2010); David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce-or
Replace-the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 165-73 (2009);
Kaplan, supra note 138, at 1050-51.
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There is, however, little evidence that criminal prosecution or internal
discipline has had much efficacy in the past as a means of deterring police
misconduct. Criminal prosecution of police officers for official misconduct has
generally been rare and ineffective. 199 It may be that "in most cases involving
police officers prosecutors will not prosecute and juries will not convict." 20 0 The
record involving internal discipline, even when civilian oversight or auditors are
involved, is also unencouraging.20 1 Moreover, as long as the decision to initiate
prosecution or discipline is left in the hands of politically accountable officials, we
can only expect a level of enforcement that is consistent with prevailing political
sentiment. After all, absent the exclusionary rule or some other regime that creates
an incentive to comply with the Fourth Amendment, there is no incentive for
public officials to weigh compliance with the constitutional prohibition on
unreasonable search and seizure more heavily than competing policy objectives.202
Yet, leaving decisions about whether to devote sufficient resources to securing
compliance with the Fourth Amendment to politically accountable officials is
irreconcilable with our understanding that constitutional rights, by their very
nature, must not be left to the vagaries of ordinary politics. As Justice Jackson
famously put it: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts."203
Perhaps, however, this is not an insurmountable problem with the use of
criminal or disciplinary sanctions. One can imagine a system in which the decision
to seek or impose sanctions is not left to politically accountable officials. For
example, violations of the Fourth Amendment could be sanctioned through
contempt proceedings initiated by judges.204 Still, a direct sanction on officers
would create a far more powerful incentive to commit perjury than does exclusion.
Even more serious is the risk of under- or over-deterrence. Paltry sanctions might
fail to generate sufficient deterrence, but criminal or disciplinary sanctions could
1 See SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 34-35 (2005).
200 Oaks, supra note 91, at 673.
201 See WALKER, supra note 199, at 22-28. Professor Walker has somewhat greater
enthusiasm for civilian oversight or auditing of law enforcement agencies, while adding that these are
unlikely to be effective without the power to undertake enforcement actions. See id. at 164-65.
202 For perhaps the classic argument along these lines, see Amsterdam, supra note 123, at 431-
33.
203 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
204 See, e.g., Ronald J. Rychlak, Replacing the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth Amendment
Violations as Direct Criminal Contempt, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 241, 249-53 (2010); Wigmore, supra
note 49, at 484. A hybrid, initiated by politically accountable officials but ultimately administered by
the judiciary, involves suits by the United States Attorney General alleging a pattern or practice of
constitutional violations, although the evidence to date suggests that this remedy has been of limited
efficacy. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform,
62 STAN. L. REv. 1, 52-57 (2009); Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police
Reform: Using Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REv.
351, 371-75 (2011).
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easily over-deter. It would be devilishly difficult to ascertain the correct sanction
that would provide sufficient, but not overmuch deterrence. 20 5 And, we should
take the threat of over-deterrence with particular seriousness. As we have seen,
police officers do not internalize the benefits of aggressive and successful law
enforcement, which are instead largely externalized to the public at large. Thus, a
credible direct sanction on officers could quickly over-deter. Indeed, one study of
police attitudes concluded that any system of direct Fourth Amendment sanctions
would create a serious risk of over-deterrence.206
The law has long been wary of remedies that generate over-deterrence; as we have
seen, the doctrine of qualified immunity is justified by the risk that public employees
would be over-deterred if liable whenever their conduct violated the Constitution.207
Indeed, over-deterrence has serious consequences. As one scholar put it:
[W]e don't want police officers to be extremely cautious in
stopping or arresting someone: we want police officers to
intervene on the street and investigate as soon as they have
"reasonable suspicion" and we want them to make an arrest just as
soon as they have probable cause. This is especially true when the
crime is serious.208
Elsewhere, I have argued that there is substantial evidence suggesting that New
York City's program of aggressive stop-and-frisk of suspects in high-crime areas
deserves significant credit for the large reductions in violent crime in that city over
the past two decades. 20 9 Like most debates in criminology, this one is dogged by
methodological problems, and one cannot be confident of the reasons for this
crime drop, but a number of highly respected scholars have concluded that there is
205 One attempt along these lines is a proposal by George Thomas to impose fines with a
minimum set at one percent of an officer's annual salary or $400 for an officer making $40,000 a
year, although Professor Thomas acknowledges that this proposal could generate over-deterrence.
See Thomas, supra note 182, at 65-69. See also Robert P. Davidow, Criminal Procedure
Ombudsman Revisited, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 939, 955 (1982) (recommending a minimum
award set at 1.5% of annual gross income set at the minimum wage). The potential for over-
deterrence seems real when the minimum fine is not trivial given an officer's typically modest salary,
especially because it could be imposed on multiple occasions, particularly on officers dedicated to
aggressive enforcement; moreover, a system that includes a threat of larger fines could have quite a
significant deterrent effect, especially when we recall that officers do not internalize the benefits of
aggressive search-and-seizure. At the end of the day, however, it seems likely that one can form no
reliable judgment about whether such an approach is likely to over- or under-deter; in any event, it
would require an extraordinary bit of luck, if this approach somehow were able to produce something
like optimal deterrence given the many imponderables in assessing how officers are likely to respond
to threats of personal liability.206 See Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 96, at 362-63.
207 See supra text accompanying note 76.
208 Pizzi, supra note 143, at 33-34.
209 See Rosenthal, supra note 71, at 315-30. For the similar view of an eminent criminologist,
see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK'S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME
AND ITS CONTROL 131-44 (2012).
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a serious case to be made that aggressive stop-and-frisk in "hot spots" of crime
saves lives.210 If there is even a reasonable chance that this view is sound, we
should be quite hesitant to adopt a remedial scheme that could create potent
incentives for police to stay off the street and in the doughnut shop. Seen in this
light, the limitations on the deterrent efficacy of exclusion begin to seem a virtue,
not a vice.
Perhaps the most attractive alternative to exclusion involves the award of
damages for Fourth Amendment violations. As we have seen in our consideration
of Thesis Six, current law permits such awards, subject to significant defenses such
as qualified immunity. Indeed, there is good reason to doubt the deterrent efficacy
of the current regime of damages liability in the absence of exclusion. For
example, there is empirical evidence that adoption of the exclusionary rule
produced increases in crime rates. 2 1 1  This suggests that exclusion's abolition
might induce elected officials to ignore the strictures of the Fourth Amendment,
instead willingly paying damages in order to reap the political benefits of reduced
crime. Indeed, under current law, damages are not available for conviction or
imprisonment that is the result of a constitutional violation, at least until the
conviction is vacated.212 Thus, if the exclusionary rule were abolished, elected
officials could reap the political rewards associated with enhanced ability to
convict the guilty and reduce crime, without having to pay damages reflecting the
additional convictions that such a regime would make possible.
Current law also limits compensatory damages to amounts representing a
jury's assessment of actual injury, rather than the importance of the right at
stake.213 It may, accordingly, be doubted whether most violations of the Fourth
Amendment will give rise to substantial damages awards. Even more
fundamental, it is problematic to leave the potency of Fourth Amendment remedies
to the sensibilities of juries. Juries can be expected to provide a remedy only as
robust as the value that current community sensibilities place on Fourth
Amendment rights. As we have seen, however, the Constitution requires that
protection for rights not be left to the whims of majoritarian sentiment.2 14 Finally,
as we have also seen, public employees are typically indemnified for their legal
210 See, e.g., COMM. To IMPROVE RESEARCH INFO. & DATA ON FIREARMS, NAT'L RESEARCH
COuNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 230-35 (Charles F. Wellford, John V.
Pepper & Carol V. Petrie eds., 2005); COMM. To REVIEW RESEARCH ON POLICE POL'Y & PRACTICES,
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 235-40
(Wesle Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004).
2 See Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure on Crime Rates:
Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46 J.L. & EcoN. 157, 159, 172-74 (2003).
For a formal economic model that endeavors to demonstrate that a stronger exclusionary rule
increases crime, see Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, The Effects of the Fourth Amendment: An
Economic Analysis, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 22, 25-35 (2008).
212 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487 n.7 (1994).
213 See, e.g., Memphis Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306-10 (1986).
214 See supra text accompanying note 203.
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costs. 2 15 Indemnification means that damages awards, like exclusion, impose no
direct costs on officers, and therefore are of uncertain deterrent efficacy. Indeed,
in light of these problems, there has long been near-consensus among both
supporters and opponents of exclusion that the existing regime of damages liability
is inadequate to secure compliance with the Fourth Amendment.2 16
None of this means that a robust damages remedy cannot have a sufficient
deterrent effect; as one critic of exclusion, Christopher Slobogin, has observed,
"[t]he single area in which most police departments have both rigorous training
and systematic administrative rules is in the use of force, which happens to be one
of the few domains where the police are successfully sued for large sums of
money."2 17  Indeed, those who support replacing the exclusionary rule with a
regime of damages awards argue that some provision must be made to ensure that
damages are substantial.2 18 Yet, merely guaranteeing that damages awards for
Fourth Amendment violations will be substantial is an insufficient answer. As we
have seen, officers do not internalize most, if not all, of the benefits of search and
seizure; accordingly, if officers were personally liable for such awards, over-
deterrence is the likely result.2 19 What little empirical evidence on this subject
exists suggests that the threat of over-deterrence is real; a survey of Chicago
narcotics officers found that 95% believed that under a regime of damages liability
"police would be afraid to conduct the searches they should make," 220 and a survey
of Ventura County, California officers found that while 57% supported retention of
the exclusionary rule, only 2% thought that the Fourth Amendment should be
enforced through monetary fines, 11% supported discipline including potential
termination, and 4% supported awards of damages after some form of hearing. 221
215 See supra text accompanying note 73.
216 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); I LAFAVE, supra note 181, at § 1.2(b); WALKER, supra note
199, at 32-33; Amsterdam, supra note 123, at 429-30; Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 93, at 1626-
34; Calabresi, supra note 136, at 114-15; Harris, supra note 198, at 156-57; Jacobi, supra note 91, at
654-55; Jefflies, supra note 169, at 131-33; Maclin, supra note 39, at 61-65; Marceau, supra note
169, at 717-30; Meltzer, supra note 180, at 283-86; Oaks, supra note 91, at 718; Perrin et al., supra
note 92, at 737-40; William A. Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to
the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1386-89 (1981); Slobogin, supra note 32, at 385-86;
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REv. 881, 899-905 (1991).
217 Slobogin, supra note 32, at 396 (footnote omitted).
218 See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 421-22 & n.5 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); AMAR, supra note
19, at 41-42; SCHLESINGER, supra note 91, at 77-78; Barnett, supra note 91, at 977-80; Barrett,
supra note 114, at 594-95; Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1, 23-27, 30-32 (2001); Estreicher & Weick, supra note 198, at 962-63; Caleb Foote,
Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493, 512-13 (1955);
Perrin et al., supra note 92, at 748-49; Slobogin, supra note 32, at 386-87, 397-400.
219 See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 114, at 593; Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal
Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again ", 74 N.C. L. REv.
1559, 1620 (1996); Jacobi, supra note 91, at 654-55; Posner, supra note 19, at 65-66; Seidman,
supra note 182, at 2300-02; Stuntz, supra note 137, at 445.
220 Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence, supra note 95, at 1053.
221 Perrin et al., supra note 92, at 733 tbl.7.
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While one might appropriately be cynical about the motivations underlying these
responses, they nevertheless provide insight into the likely reaction of officers to a
regime of damages liability-especially one with bite. The problem becomes
greater as the recoverable damages increase. Professor Slobogin, for example,
advocates a regime of liquidated damages "somewhere between one percent and
five percent" of an officer's salary.22 2 As we have seen, however, the personal
liability, especially when potential damages are substantial, poses serious risks of
over-deterrence.223 Although Professor Slobogin believes that political pressure
and professional norms will prevent over-deterrence,224 this speculation is
unsupported by empirical evidence; it is quite a gamble to believe that a regime
that requires officers to internalize many of the costs and few of the benefits of
search and seizure will generate enough but not too much deterrence. For this
reason, and to ensure an incentive to bring damages claims by making a deep-
pocket defendant available, most damages advocates take a different view, arguing
that liability should either be directly imposed on public employers rather than
individual officers, or that the public employer be required to indemnify its
employees for judgments against them. 22 5
One could wonder why any regime of damages liability-whether against the
government or individual officials-is thought superior to exclusion. If damages
liability is of less deterrent efficacy than the exclusionary rule, it would risk a
breach of the constitutional requirement of adequate deterrence set out in Thesis
Three. If, conversely, damages liability is of equal or greater deterrent efficacy, it
should not, in the aggregate, make available more probative evidence of guilt than
the exclusionary rule; it would present greater risks of over-deterrence, and would
not reduce litigation costs or the incidence of police perjury. Indeed, the advocates
of damages liability do not claim any advantages for that regime in terms of these
asserted defects in the exclusionary rule. Instead, they contend that the
exclusionary rule distorts constitutional adjudication because it means that courts
cannot vindicate a Fourth Amendment claim without aiding a criminal to escape
punishment, and for that reason exclusion reduces the scope of Fourth Amendment
222 Slobogin, supra note 32, at 405-06.
223 See supra text accompanying notes 205-10.
224 See Slobogin, supra note 32, at 409-11.
225 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
421-22 & n.5 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); AMAR, supra note 19, at 40-41; SCHLESINGER, supra note
91, at 77-78; Barnett, supra note 91, at 975; Barrett, supra note 114, at 594-95; Dripps, supra note
218, at 27-28; Foote, supra note 218, at 514-15; Perrin et al., supra note 92, at 748; Posner, supra
note 19, at 66-68. Even Professor Slobogin believes that officers should be immune from liability
based on negligence and indemnified for their legal costs. See Slobogin, supra note 32, at 411-12.
Limiting individual liability to reckless or bad-faith conduct, however, could well make individual
liability a rarity. If recklessness or bad faith is understood in a manner sufficiently broad to make
personal liability a robust threat, in contrast, over-deterrence would be a significant problem.
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22protections.226 The claim has at least surface plausibility; as one scholar put it, the
exclusionary rule "flaunts before us the costs we must pay for [F]ourth
[A]mendment guarantees."227
On inspection, however, the claim that the exclusionary rule circumscribes
Fourth Amendment protection is problematic. It is, after all, an empirical claim
that is supported by little in the way of empirical evidence.228 There is, for
example, no evidence that Fourth Amendment protections are more often
recognized in damages actions than under the exclusionary rule.229 It is doubtless
difficult to document the effect of exclusion on judicial psychology, yet, the claim
that judges will not rule for unattractive litigants presenting constitutional claims is
inconsistent with what we know about other areas of constitutional law. After all,
constitutional claims that effectively immunize bad people from sanctions are
hardly unique to Fourth Amendment law.
Consider the First Amendment's prohibition on laws "abridging the freedom
of speech."230 Unattractive litigants seeking immunity for unattractive conduct
seem to fare quite well in First Amendment litigation. For example, the Court has
ruled in favor of individuals who had unlawfully burned crosses on the property of
others to intimidate racial minorities,23 1 those who picketed military funerals to
express the belief that God hates the United States for tolerating homosexuality, 232
a public employee who expressed approval of an attempt to assassinate the
President,2 33 the publisher of a crude parody falsely stating that a religious figure
was both a drunk and incestuous,234 an individual sentenced to death after evidence
had been introduced of his membership in a white racist prison gang,2 35 an
individual convicted for his role in an armed gathering of Ku Klux Klan members
involving the liberal use of racial slurs and anti-Semitic sentiment, 236 individuals
226 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 19, at 30; Barnett, supra note 91, at 960-66; Caldwell &
Chase, supra note 19, at 53-54; Dripps, supra note 218, at 22; Jacobi, supra note 91, at 656-60;
Pizzi, su ra note 93, at 715-16; Slobogin, supra note 32, at 401-05.
22 Kaplan, supra note 138, at 1037.228 The best evidence on point is a survey of narcotics officers, lawyers, and judges in Chicago
in which the clear majority of respondents believed that judges fail to suppress evidence even when
the law requires it, Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury and the Heater Factor, supra note 95, at 119, but the
clear majority also believed that exclusion has a deterrent effect and is a more effective restraint than
a damages remedy, id. at 123-30.
229 See Leong, supra note 170, at 43 1. To be sure, current damages litigation may be infected
by the knowledge that rulings recognizing expansive Fourth Amendment protections can trigger
exclusion in criminal cases, and inhibited as well by the other limitations on damages liability
canvassed in our consideration of Thesis Six.230 U.S. CONST. amend. I.231 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992).232 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
233 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
234 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
235 See Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
236 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
2013] 563
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIAINAL LAW
prosecuted for burning the flag of the United States, 237 indulging in crude anti-
Semitic rhetoric that had threatened to provoke violence,238 and falsely claiming to
have received high military honors.2 39 The Court has even permitted litigants
whose own conduct is constitutionally unprotected to challenge laws written with
sufficient breadth to reach protected speech because of the chilling effect that such
laws may have on the rights of third parties. 240 The Court surely did not enjoy
vindicating any of these claims, but it has understood that principled protection for
free speech requires protecting even the most unattractive of litigants.
There is little reason to believe that judges are less willing to vindicate Fourth
Amendment claims when faced with an unattractive litigant. For one thing, as we
have seen, it is wrong to claim that exclusion offers nothing to the innocent; when
Fourth Amendment violations are deterred by a reasonably robust exclusionary
rule, the innocent are less likely to be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure.
Indeed, the rationale for permitting litigants to challenge overbroad laws even
when their own speech is unprotected bears a striking resemblance to the deterrent
justification for exclusion. Moreover, if a damages remedy had comparable
deterrent efficacy to the exclusionary rule, it would inhibit efforts to obtain
probative evidence of wrongdoing no less than exclusion. Thus, if the judiciary is
prepared to truncate Fourth Amendment protections in order to enhance the
effectiveness of law enforcement, it would surely realize that robust Fourth
Amendment protections will inhibit law enforcement whether enforced by the
exclusionary rule or a damages regime. To be sure, the costs of exclusion may be
more transparent, but, as we have seen, this feature is an important virtue of
exclusion because it sensitizes the judiciary to the costs of expansive Fourth
Amendment protections.241 Accordingly, if a damages remedy made the extent to
which a broad conception of Fourth Amendment rights inhibited effective law
enforcement less apparent, the judiciary might be tempted to indulge an overly
generous conception of what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure
without appropriately considering its costs, even though some effort to weigh
privacy against law enforcement interests seems required by the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on "unreasonable" search and seizure.242 If, on the other
hand, damages are a less effective deterrent than exclusion, then a regime of
237 See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
238 See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949).
239 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
240 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244, 255 (2002); City of Houston v.
Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459-69 (1987); Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569,
574-76 (1987).
241 See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
242 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ("[T]here is 'no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the
search [or seizure] entails."' (quoting Camara v. Mun. CL, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (all but first
brackets in original)).
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damages liability is in considerable tension with Thesis Three's insistence that the
Fourth Amendment requires a remedy with deterrent heft.
Moreover, it is far from clear that a regime of damages liability would have
deterrent efficacy. As we have seen in our consideration of imposing direct
sanctions or personal liability on officers, there are enormous difficulties in
creating a regime of personal liability that would provide sufficient, but not
overmuch deterrence. Yet, the advocates of governmental liability as an
alternative to personal liability are strikingly vague about how to set damages at a
sufficient level to achieve optimal deterrence. Randy Barnett offers a typical
formulation: "[T]he damages must not be so low as to trivialize the right that was
violated, nor so high as to overcompensate a victim of a rights violation (and also
deter its imposition)."243 This calculus, of course, is less than crystal clear. As we
have seen, among the exclusionary rule's virtues is that it reliably creates a
political incentive to comply with the Fourth Amendment but is unlikely to over-
deter. It is highly uncertain that damages liability can be calculated in a fashion
that hits as sweet a spot.244 MoTover, the mechanism by which deterrence would
operate is scarcely more direct than with exclusion. If damages are not paid by the
offending officer to avoid the threat of over-deterrence, then they must be paid by
whatever governmental entity controls the appropriation of public funds. This
reintroduces the asserted defect of the exclusionary rule, which operates against the
prosecutor rather than the investigator, since "one agency of government (the
police) perpetrates the harm, another agency defends it in court (the law
department), and a third agency writes the check (the treasurer)."245
In fact, the uncertain deterrent character of damages against the government
has an even more fundamental cause than the division of responsibilities within the
government. Professor Levinson has argued that because government is not a
revenue or profit-maximizer, but instead responds to political costs and benefits,
we cannot be confident that any regime of governmental damages liability will
produce anything like an optimal level of deterrence because government lacks the
incentive to minimize costs and maximize profits that exists in the private sector.246
The likelihood that the government will undertake efforts to reduce its exposure to
liability is particularly remote, Levinson argued, when it comes to law enforcement
efforts that could pay handsome political dividends.247 Accordingly, Levinson
243 Barnett, supra note 91, at 980.
244 Perhaps the most interesting proposal along these lines is that of Professor Dripps, who
argues that courts should set damage awards high enough so that government is likely to prefer
exclusion of the evidence, and then offer the prosecution the option of paying the award and using the
evidence. See Dripps, supra note 218, at 30-32. In response, Professor Thomas observed that not
only will it be difficult for judges to monetize the value of the evidence, but this process reintroduces
whatever judicial temptation exists to structure the law in order to minimize exclusion. See Thomas,
supra note 182, at 52-54.
245 WALKER, supra note 199, at 33.246 See Levinson, supra note 125, at 348-57.
247 See id. at 370.
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concluded that "any predictions about the incentive effects of . .. cost remedies ...
are highly suspect." 248
I am rather a skeptic when it comes to Professor Levinson's assessment of
damages liability. Although I share his view that government responds to political
and not economic incentives, elsewhere I have argued at some length that there is
ample reason to believe that government is sensitive to damages liability because it
diverts scarce governmental resources from what policymakers are likely to regard
as more politically advantageous uses.249 Still, the political costs of government
damages liability, like the political benefits of liability-creating search and seizure,
are not readily monetizable. For that reason, one cannot be confident of the
magnitude of the deterrent effect of damages liability. More than a little
skepticism is warranted as to the ability of judges or juries to set damages at an
amount that will create an appropriate quantum of deterrence.
Professor Slobogin has argued that we should not worry overmuch about the
risk of over-deterrence even in a more robust regime of damages liability given the
political incentives to engage in aggressive law enforcement.2 50 I have similarly
argued that damages liability is not likely to produce over-deterrence when it
comes to governmental activities that generate political benefits, such as
aggressive law enforcement.25' If this is correct, however, it highlights yet another
anomaly about using damages liability to secure compliance with the Fourth
Amendment. As Walter Dellinger once argued, it is surely troubling to permit the
government to buy its way out of compliance with the Fourth Amendment by
effectively identifying a price at which the government may engage in
unreasonable search and seizure.252 Professor Slobogin's acknowledgement of
what are often regarded as the political benefits of aggressive search-and-seizure
adds an important corollary-the deterrent efficacy of any regime of damages
liability will depend at any given time on how much political support there is for
an aggressive regime of policing likely to produce constitutional violations.
248 Id. at 386-87. One of the few efforts to gather pertinent empirical evidence regarding
governmental sensitivity to police misconduct litigation found that while most police departments
made some effort to track litigation, they do not systematically use information derived from
litigation to make personnel or policy decisions. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of
Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1023,
1041-75 (2010). It is hard to know what to make of this finding; the fact that most departments do
not use particular litigation outcomes to make personnel or policy decisions does not mean that
elected officials ultimately responsible for budgeting and policy are indifferent to liability.
Moreover, this finding may be driven by the limited liability and damages available under current
law, which the advocates of a more muscular regime of damages liability would alter. Indeed, as we
have seen, there is evidence that police departments pay considerable attention to use-of-force
policies, where exposure to liability is likely to be greatest. See supra text accompanying note 217.
249 See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 831-41.
250 See Slobogin, supra note 32, at 407-09, 412-14.
251 See Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Thoughts on Damages for Wrongful Convictions, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 127, 152-53 (2010).
252 See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV.
L. REv. 1532, 1561-63 (1972).
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Because government responds to political and not economic incentives, as political
support for tough-on-crime policy builds, damages awards must proportionately
increase if deterrent efficacy is to be maintained. Thus, when political support for
aggressive search-and-seizure is high, judges or juries will have to set the "price"
for violating the Fourth Amendment at a correspondingly high level to maintain
deterrence. We should be more than a little skeptical that judges or juries would
have the political acumen to monetize political incentives that would be necessary
to maintain deterrence in a regime in which damages are paid by the government,
either directly or through indemnification. Conversely, if damages awards are
large enough to offset the political pressure that sometimes produces overly
aggressive search-and-seizure, or are paid by the individual officers, then, as we
have seen, there is a serious risk of over-deterrence.
The likely willingness of the government to engage in vigorous search and seizure
despite exposure to substantial liability, moreover, not only raises questions about the
deterrent efficacy of damages liability, but also exposes one final anomaly of the
damages regime. To maintain adequate deterrence, a regime of damages liability will
most likely require that the government (or individual officers) be exposed to
substantial damages liability, at least when there is significant political support for the
kind of aggressive law enforcement techniques likely to run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment. At the same time, if damages do not lead to over-deterrence, there will
still be Fourth Amendment violations when officers err on the side of search and
seizure. Thus, Fourth Amendment violations are no more likely to disappear than any
other form of misconduct that invites damages liability. The funds to pay damages,
however, must come from somewhere.
Even in a regime of personal liability imposed on individual officers, we can
expect that officers will demand indemnification or additional compensation to
offset the risk of personal liability; if they do not receive such compensation, we
can expect that the quality of officers willing to serve for effectively reduced
compensation will decline, over-deter, or (probably) both. Indeed, the desire to
avoid these by-products of liability-risk likely explains the prevalence of
indemnification in public employment, which, as we have seen, is ubiquitous.253
Thus, one way or another, the government must pay the cost of a regime of
damages liability (as well as the costs of defending damages litigation). Moreover,
if we reasonably assume that at any given time, the voters' willingness to provide
revenue to the government through some combination of taxes and debt is
essentially fixed, then damages and other legal costs must be paid by reallocating
resources. Allocating public resources is, of course, an intensely political process.
Governmental functions with the widest and most intense political support, such as
policing, fire protection, and public education, are the least likely to be denied
resources. The political consequences of denying police departments the resources
that police executives regard as necessary to keep the public safe, in particular, are
likely to be deemed unacceptable; damages judgments are unlikely to come out of
253 See supra text accompanying note 73.
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the hide of policing. Thus, as Professor Thomas has observed, when budgeting for
Fourth Amendment damages liability, "the incentives there are mostly
perverse."254 As I have argued elsewhere, the money to pay damages will likely
come from programs serving constituencies with the most limited political
influence-most likely the poor.2 55 Even if the funds allocated for the payment of
damages come from elsewhere, there is sure to be some cost to social welfare if
these funds are reallocated from an endeavor that produces widespread and
important social benefits to the payment of Fourth Amendment damages and
associated legal costs.2 56
Thus, given the political incentive to engage in vigorous law enforcement, a
robust damages remedy is unlikely to come anywhere close to eliminating Fourth
Amendment violations, and the bulk of the costs of such a regime will not be
imposed on individual wrongdoers, or even law enforcement agencies, but instead
will be externalized to the public at large-especially to those who are particularly
dependent on the ability of the government to finance important services.
In contrast, the mechanism by which the exclusionary rule produces
deterrence seems quite straightforward. Exclusion is unlikely to produce over-
deterrence, but reliably generates a straightforward political incentive to encourage
officers to comply with the Fourth Amendment that has little if any effect on other
governmental functions. As we saw in our consideration of Thesis Four, the
exclusionary rule reliably generates deterrence by creating a political incentive to
which the government is likely to respond. The government, moreover, cannot
buy its way out of compliance with the Fourth Amendment when enforced by
exclusion. Damages liability, however, creates a political incentive to comply with
the Fourth Amendment only indirectly, and even then, only if sufficient resources
must be diverted to the payment of judgments to create a sufficiently potent
political incentive to comply with the Fourth Amendment to outweigh
countervailing political incentives. The resources that must be devoted to the
payment of judgments, in turn, will be unavailable elsewhere, potentially causing
serious hardships for innocent third parties. The mechanism by which damages
liability generates deterrence-or at least a reformed regime of damages liability
with adequate heft to produce a reliable deterrent-is largely untested, and full of
the potential for unintended harms. The mechanism by which exclusion generates
deterrence, in contrast, is familiar, and largely free of unintended consequences.
Seen in this light, the exclusionary rule begins to look, rather, much like the
devil we know. Thesis Seven suggests that those who do not like to gamble will
want to stick with the exclusionary rule. The problems with exclusion are well
known, and many of the limitations on exclusion are likely appropriate; but the
exclusionary rule ultimately may be justifiable in terms of something like those
254 Thomas, supra note 182, at 55.
255 See Rosenthal, supra note 251, at 135.
256 For a more extensive argument along these lines, see Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 845-47.
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Churchill used to defend democracy: "the worst form of Government except for all
other[s]. ... ,257
257 CHURCHILL BY HIMSELF 573 (Richard M. Langworth ed., 2008).

